In a pair of decisions in 2015, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Delaware determined that neither the first lien notes trustee nor the second lien notes trustee of Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Corp. (“EFIH”), a subsidiary of Energy Future Holdings (“EFH”), was entitled to receive a make-whole on the repayment of the corresponding indebtedness resulting from the acceleration of that debt in the EFH bankruptcy case.
Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation1shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Third Circuit recently affirmed that a debtor in Chapter 11 can use a tender offer to settle claims without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code. Although In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.is limited to its particular facts and circumstances, the decision could lead to increased use of tender offers prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.
Several recent cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have created ambiguity about when distressed exchange offers violate Section 316(b) of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”). It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers are using this ambiguity to challenge distressed exchange offers. The threat of litigation may give minority bondholders a powerful tool to hinder less than fully consensual out-of-court restructurings and provide them with increased leverage in negotiations.
Market participants involved in distressed exchange offers have become accustomed to grappling with the implications of Trust Indenture Act Section 316(b) in the context of potential exit consents, i.e., are the contemplated amendments to the indenture governing the securities subject to the exchange significant enough to impair or affect the right of a holder to receive payment of principal and interest on or after the due dates of the relevant note?
A typical bond indenture provides that prior to the incurrence of an event of default, a trustee’s obligations are limited to those specifically set forth in the indenture. It is only following the occurrence of an event of default that the trustee’s duties of prudent conduct seem to ripen. This often leaves trustees and bondholders in a state of uncertainty over what actions, if any, a trustee may be obligated to take as the financial condition of an issuer worsens but has not yet crossed the default line. A recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Becker v.
With the current interest being focused on Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, this may be a good time to examine the differing rights of noteholders under an indenture governed by the TIA and the rights of lenders under credit agreements governed by New York law.
Bottom Line:
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina in In re Barnwell County Hospital, No. 11-06207 (Bankr. D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2011) held that anad hoc community group of citizens formed for the purpose of attempting to keep the Barnwell County hospital open and operating in its current location (the “Community Group”) was not a party-in-interest in the hospital’s bankruptcy case and so lacked standing to challenge the debtor’s eligibility for relief under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On August 9, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a non-insider's debt claim can be recharacterized as equity in Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil, Inc.).2 The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the district court, held that: (i) there is no per se rule limiting to insiders the recharacterization of debt claims as equity and (ii) non-insider debt claims may be recharacterized as equity under section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.