In Gulfport Energy Corp. v. FERC, 41 F.4th 667 (5th Cir. 2022), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit tripled down on its nearly two-decades-long view that filed-rate contracts regulated under the National Gas Act (the "NGA") and the Federal Power Act (the "FPA") can be rejected in bankruptcy without the consent of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Reaffirming its previous rulings in In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004), and In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 28 F.4th 629 (5th Cir.

Even before chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 2005 to govern cross-border bankruptcy proceedings, the enforceability of a foreign court order approving a restructuring plan that modified or discharged U.S. law-governed debt was well recognized under principles of international comity. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently reaffirmed this concept in In re Modern Land (China) Co., Ltd., 641 B.R. 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022).

When lenders use an aggressive strategy to deal with a financially troubled borrower that ultimately files for bankruptcy protection, stakeholders in the case, including chapter 11 debtors, trustees, committees, and even individual creditors or shareholders, frequently pursue causes of action against the lenders in an effort to augment or create recoveries.

Whether a contract is "executory" such that it can be assumed, rejected, or assigned in bankruptcy is a question infrequently addressed by the circuit courts of appeals. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provided some rare appellate court-level guidance on the question in Matter of Falcon V, L.L.C., 44 F.4th 348 (5th Cir. 2022). The Fifth Circuit affirmed lower-court rulings determining that a surety contract was not executory because the surety had already posted irrevocable surety bonds and did not owe further performance to the debtors.

The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”) came into force on 1 August 2016 and replaced the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 (the “1930 Act”).

The previous 1930 Act had enabled a third party to bring a claim directly against an insurer where the insured had become insolvent, however a claimant had to (i) restore a dissolved company to the register of companies and obtain the leave of the court to allow proceedings to be commenced; (ii) obtain judgment against the insured; and (iii) commence separate proceedings against the insurer.

As discussed in previous installments of this White Paper series, the Lummis-Gillibrand Responsible Financial Innovation Act (the “Bill”)¹ proposes a comprehensive statutory and regulatory framework in an effort to bring stability to the digital asset market. One area of proposed change relates to how digital assets and digital asset exchanges would be treated in bankruptcy. If enacted, the Bill would significantly alter the status quo from a bankruptcy perspective

OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL ASSETS IN BANKRUPTCY

In Short

The Situation: Courts have disagreed over whether a make-whole premium triggered by a borrower's bankruptcy filing must be disallowed as unmatured interest. They have also disputed whether the "solvent-debtor exception" requiring the payment of postpetition interest to unimpaired unsecured creditors of a solvent debtor survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, courts have split on what rate of postpetition interest unimpaired unsecured creditors of a solvent debtor are entitled to receive.

Litigation funding continues to be a popular investment vehicle in the UK as the assets available to funders topped £2bn at the start of the decade. Bloomberg has noted that a “flood of money” was moving into the area. This trend appears likely to continue as funders are attracted to litigation as an investment vehicle as economic uncertainty persists and the post-COVID litigation landscape develops.

On 5 October 2022, the Supreme Court delivered its long awaited judgment in BTI 2014 LLC V Sequana SA [2022] UKSC 25 dismissing an appeal by BTI. Lord Reed and Lady Arden each gave their own judgments which concurred, largely applying the same reasoning, with the judgment of Lord Briggs with whom Lord Kitchen and Lord Hodge agreed.

BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING REVIEW VOL. 21 • NO. 5 SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 2022 1 IN THIS ISSUE 1 Texas District Court: Bankruptcy Sale Break-Up Fee Satisfied Both Business Judgment Test and Administrative Expense Standard 2 Lawyer Spotlight: Gregory M.