Congress passed the operative texts without noticeable fanfare. From its enactment to today, section 363(k) has entitled a secured creditor to “credit bid” the full amount of the debt owed by a debtor in any sale of the underlying collateral pursuant to section 363(b). That this statutory bequest elicited little debate made imminent sense, for Congress had thereby codified one of secured creditors’ seemingly time-honored rights.
In my earlier posts I wrote about
and
Too many fish in the pond, too many electric birds not yet in the sky
In Short
The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.
On April 24, 2023, the First Circuit’s opinion in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin came up for oral argument before the Supreme Court. At issue in this appeal is whether this provision’s “abrogat[ion]” of sovereign immunity “as to a governmental unit,” defined to include any “other … domestic government” in section 101(27), embodies a congressional intention to revoke the sovereign immunity of a Native American tribe with sufficient and obvious clarity to be construed as such a revocation.
On April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC, ruled Bankruptcy Code section 363(m) to be non-jurisdictional, i.e. just a “mere restriction on the effects of a valid exercise” of judicial power “when a party successfully appeals a covered authorization.” Before MOAC, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held section 363(m) to be non-jurisdictional, but the Fifth and Second Circuits had diverged.
Reasoning
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has ruled that a creditor or trustee seeking to recover a subsequent transfer under Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code need not obtain a judgment of avoidance against the subsequent transferee before proceeding with the recovery action.
In In re Schubert, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of an adversary proceeding because the appellants had failed the “person-aggrieved” test for bankruptcy appellate standing. Had they challenged this standard’s existence, two of the three judges likely would have “abrogate[d]” it; the third would have salvaged it. This decision’s dicta represents perhaps the first outright rejection of bankruptcy’s appellate standing touchstone based on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S.
The statutory language is clear. As of a bankruptcy petition’s filing date, the automatic stay of section 362 constricts many a creditor and bars many an action. The broad scope of section 362(a)(1) proscribes “the commencement or continuation ...
When can a municipality declare bankruptcy under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code? An issue explored the headline-grabbing chapter 9 case of Detroit, that’s the question illuminated by a decision dealing with the travails of Chester, Pennsylvania, issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“Bankruptcy Court”) on March 14, 2023.
Chester’s Long Road to Insolvency
Background
A chapter 11 plan may be modified after votes have been solicited on the plan, but prior to confirmation, without providing creditors and interest holders with an amended disclosure statement and another opportunity to vote on the modified plan, provided, among other things, that the modifications do not adversely affect creditors or interest holders who previously voted to accept the plan.