Fulltext Search

Introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, the restructuring plans regime set out in Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (Plans) has quickly proven a popular route for corporate financial rescue. This is in large part due to the fact that it allows for a plan to be imposed upon dissenting creditor classes in certain circumstances. This is known as "cross-class cramdown".

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has decisively redrawn the boundaries between arbitration agreements and insolvency proceedings in the case of Sian Participation Corp (In Liquidation) v Halimeda International Ltd.[1]

Insolvenzanträge von namhaften Projektentwicklern und Immobiliengesellschaften stellen die betroffenen Unternehmen und ihre Gläubiger vor große Herausforderungen und setzen die gesamte Immobilienbranche unter Druck. Gleichzeitig gewinnen alternative Restrukturierungsmethoden, die außerhalb oder bereits im Vorfeld eines formalen Insolvenzverfahrens stattfinden, zunehmend an Bedeutung.

Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt auch vermehrt das Stichwort “StaRUG“, wenn es um die Restrukturierung von immobilienhaltenden Gesellschaften geht.

This article was first published by Insol World Magazine in Q1 of 2024.

Insolvency office-holders in the UK and elsewhere frequently rely upon litigation funders to finance their legal proceedings and, accordingly, developments in the funding market are of keen interest to insolvency professionals.

Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.

When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.

Background