目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言，破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中，投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等，其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式（其基本流程如下图），本文将结合实践，从投资人视角，浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范，以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。

图1：破产重整中股权投资基本流程图

一、重整投资的机遇

现阶段，重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例，2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1]；2024年以来，截至11月，有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整，较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见，破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会，其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。

Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

近年来，越来越多的企业面临债务困境，由于该等企业较多成立时间久、体量巨大，且存在经营多元化、债权债务形式多样化的情形，企业资金链的断裂易引发债务风险，实践中迫切需要进行债务重组，使债权人得到受偿，让企业重获新生。从目前情况来看，信托工具越来越多地被应用于债务重组中，包括在破产重整前的债务重组阶段，也包括在破产重整阶段。根据中国信托业协会于2022年12月12日发布的《2022年3季度中国信托业发展评析》，截至2022年3季度末，我国信托资产规模余额约为21.07万亿元。另根据建信信托有限责任公司（“建信信托”）发布的《建信信托2021年年度报告》，截至2021年12月31日，建信信托破产重整服务信托规模超2,300亿元[1]；根据中信信托有限责任公司（“中信信托”）发布的《中信信托二〇二一年年度报告》，截至2021年12月31日，中信信托特殊资产服务信托业务受托规模近160亿元[2]。

One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.

How does it happen?

As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.

When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

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