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在各类跨境投资的项目中,投资人最担心的问题莫过于被投企业的财务状况出现困境,影响其持续经营能力和偿债能力并最终演变为债务危机,或者集团的持股结构、治理结构不够透明,各种交叉持股盘根错节。在重组过程中,投资者可能会帮助公司梳理、调整各种投资主体架构,而企业为了解除投资者顾虑,有时也会主动进行投资主体架构的重组和优化,包括把多余的主体和结构层级精简掉。

在跨境投资的架构中,往往涉及到多层持股架构,开曼公司、BVI公司以及香港公司都是常见的持股主体。如果我们在重组中需要把这些主体精简注销,需要走什么样的程序,复杂不复杂?在本文中,我们将与大家分享开曼豁免有限公司的清盘和解散,并且后续文章中陆续与大家分享其他法域主体的清算和注销。

系列导语

在各类跨境投资的项目中,投资人最担心的问题莫过于被投企业的财务状况出现困境,进而影响其持续经营能力和偿债能力并最终演变为债务危机。这些投资人可能是企业公募或私募债券的持有人、享有抵押品的银团放贷机构、各类融资架构中的夹层债权人,或是享受回购权或强制出售权的权益投资人。

跨境投资项目下的债务重组,往往会涉及多法域下的复杂法律问题、救济方式和司法程序。特别是在典型的境外持股架构下,当开曼公司作为境外母公司出现债务危机时,如何通过BVI及香港子公司逐级下沉债权人的风控或增信机制,如何衔接和落地相关境内外救济措施,如何最终帮助债权人控制或取得境内子公司的资产或其提供的担保品或抵押品,这些问题的妥善解决是债务重组成功的关键。这要求参与跨境债务重组项目的专业执行团队具有跨市场和跨国界的运作能力、多法域的法律和司法实操经验、高效的项目管理能力以及深刻的风险认知和风险反制筹划能力。由于各个法域下的质权之设立、优先顺位和有效性对于债权人和质押权人来说至关重要,加强对主要离岸法域对质押行为的程序性规定和质权有效性的判定认识能有效地防范潜在的交易风险。

One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.

How does it happen?

As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.

When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?