In a series of cases the High Court has:
In January 2010 an interim examiner was appointed to Missford Limited, which operated the Residence Club, a private members club in St. Stephen’s Green.
In a written judgment on the costs and expenses of the interim examiner, the court held that the interim examiner “simply did more with the best of motives than his warrant permitted”. The court proceeded to refuse the interim examiner’s application for remuneration in respect of any work carried out in excess of his statutory powers.
In the matter of Cognotec Ltd (in receivership)
Section 60(14) provides that a transaction in breach of section 60 is voidable against any person who had notice of the facts which constitute the breach.
The company sought to void the debenture which secured the loan on the basis that section 60 had not been complied with and the receiver appointed on foot of the debenture brought a motion for directions.
The court held that:
In the Matter of Bell Lines Limited (In Liquidation)
That decision has effectively been relied on since 2006 for the proposition that, except for the Social Insurance Fund, a party advancing monies for the payment of remuneration falling due before the commencement of an insolvency process but actually paid after such commencement is not entitled to subrogate to the employees’ preferential claims.
The Appeal
In a recent decision, SEC v Byers,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that district courts possess the authority and discretion to bar the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions without the district court’s permission.
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a foreign representative of a foreign insolvency proceeding to seek a bankruptcy court’s assistance in an ancillary proceeding upon recognition of the foreign proceeding. Upon recognition, Chapter 15 empowers a bankruptcy court to grant broad relief to a foreign representative to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of its creditors in the United States.
Credit bidding of debt held by a secured creditor at a sale of collateral under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code has become commonplace.1 Does a secured creditor have that same ability in a sale under a chapter 11 plan? Most thought so, but according to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, not always.
Two decisions (one only weeks ago) have held that the scope of Bankruptcy Rule 2019 encompasses “informal committees” of bondholders and that such committees must comply with the extensive disclosure requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2019.1 In a recent decision, Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court came out the other way, ruling that such a committee was not a “committee representing more than one creditor” and, consequently, is not subject to Rule 2019.2 In so doing, Judge Sontchi considered but declined to follow the two decisions addressing the same issue:
Elaborating on its Resorts decision of ten years ago concerning payments to shareholders in a public leveraged buyout,1 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ruled in In re Plassein Int’l, Corp.2 that the “settlement payment” exemption of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code also insulates selling shareholders in a private LBO from fraudulent transfer liability.
Hedge funds and other investors in debt or equity securities often form unofficial “ad hoc” committees through which they actively participate in chapter 11 cases. Recent decisions affirm that such ad hoc committees must comply with the disclosure requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2019 – including the nature and amounts of claims or interests held by members and other details. What about a “group” that says it’s a lot less than an ad hoc committee and therefore, outside the Rule?
On August 30, 2008, the United States District Court for the District of Northern Texas issued its ruling on whether Americas Mining Corporation (“AMC”) (and its parent Grupo Mexico) had caused ASARCO LLC (“ASARCO”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Grupo Mexico, to fraudulently transfer stock of Southern Peru Copper Company (“SPCC”) from ASARCO to AMC. The Court determined that AMC was liable for (1) intentional fraudulent transfer, (2) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty under New Jersey law; and (3) civil conspiracy under Arizona law. See ASARCO LLC v.