Background

Bonds that are traded via clearing houses, such as Euroclear and Clearstream, often contain terms providing that there will be a trustee for the issue, who may be appointed by the participants in the relevant clearing system or by the beneficial owners.

Quite often, the terms of the bonds will contain so-called “no-action clauses”, pursuant to which the trustee may be accorded certain rights and powers to take action on behalf, and instead, of the beneficial bondholders.

Public policy, “No-Action” and arbitration clauses, and the substitution of petitioners

Background

Bonds that are traded via clearing houses, such as Euroclear and Clearstream, often contain terms providing that there will be a trustee for the issue, who may be appointed by the participants in the relevant clearing system or by the beneficial owners.

Affirming the bankruptcy court below in a case of first impression, in In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC, 481 B.R. 34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), a Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel held that a relapse into economic recession following a chapter 11 debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy was not an “extraordinary circumstance” that would justify the filing of a new chapter 11 case for the purpose of modifying the debtor’s previously confirmed plan of reorganization.

Modification of a Confirmed Chapter 11 Plan

In the first circuit-level opinion on the issue, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of establishing priority under section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, an employee's severance pay was "earned" entirely upon termination of employment, even though the severance amount was determined by the employee's length of service with the employer.

Section 507(a)(4)

The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.