(Federal Constitutional Court, judgment dated 12 January 2016, case ref. 1 BvR 3102/13)
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has now ruled on whether the exclusion of legal entities from being appointed as insolvency administrator is constitutional or not in its judgment dated 12 January 2016. The ruling was triggered by a constitutional complaint from a firm of lawyers specialising in insolvency administration, which had previously argued in vain before the civil courts for inclusion by a local court on its pre-selected list of insolvency administrators.
Mit seinem Urteil vom 10. Dezember 2015, Az. C-594 / 14, hat der EuGH entschieden, dass die Haftung eines Geschäftsführers für verbotene Aus- zahlungen nach Insolvenzreife nach §64 GmbHG eine insolvenzrechtliche Regelung darstellt und deshalb dem Anwendungsbereich der EuInsVO unterliegt.
In its ruling dated 10 December 2015, case ref. C-594 / 14, the ECJ decided that the liability of a managing director for prohibited payments following insolvency under section 64 of the GmbHG is a provision covered by insolvency law and therefore falls within the scope of application of the EU Insolvency Regulation.
In a judgment dated 26 / 03 / 2015, ref. no. IX ZR 302 / 13, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) held that a provisional insolvency administrator is personally liable for monies paid into the escrow account in the event of claims of unjust enrichment being made due to the payments having no proper basis in law.
The ruling related to the following situation:
Mit Urteil vom 26. März 2015, AZ IX ZR 302 / 13, entschied der BGH, dass ein vorläufiger Insolvenzver- walter für Zahlungen auf das Voll- rechtstreuhandkonto persönlich haf- tet, wenn Bereicherungsansprüche wegen rechtsgrundloser Zahlungen geltend gemacht werden.
Dieser Entscheidung lag folgender Sachverhalt zu Grunde:
Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").
One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.