在经济下行的时候，原来一些质地不错的企业也会陷入困境。对于困境企业而言，通过破产重整焕发生机，也许是最后一根救命稻草；对于投资人而言，未来真正的赚钱机会，也将出现在更多、更复杂的破产重整项目中。今天，我想跟大家谈谈破产重整投资的趋势、挑战与未来。

一、重整投资的趋势

首先，我们来谈谈重整投资已经展现出的四个变化趋势。

第一个趋势，是从被动投资到主动投资。

什么是被动投资？以往一些破产项目中的重整投资人，往往本身就是破产企业的债权人，他们随着陷入危机的破产企业一起被困在了“水中”，不得不通过参与重整投资寻求最后的“上岸”机会，比较典型的就是一些作为困境企业债权人的AMC公司。

什么是主动投资？这几年里，逐渐有一些“岸上的人”也瞄准了重整投资领域。“岸上的人”，是与困境企业没有关系的外部投资人，他们没有受到困境企业的牵连，而是将重整投资视作一个宝贵的商业机会，主动参与其中。这样的“岸上投资人”，既包括产业投资人，也包括财务投资人。

Tolstoy warned that “if you look for perfection, you’ll never be content”; but Tolstoy wasn’t a bankruptcy lawyer. In the world of secured lending, perfection is paramount. A secured lender that has not properly perfected its lien can lose its collateral and end up with unsecured status if its borrower files bankruptcy.

1. 最实在的权利 清算优先权，或优先清算权(Liquidation Preference)，是指“清算事件”发生时，投资人在清算财产分配过程中享有优先顺位的权利。通常，越晚进来的投资人清算优先的顺位越高，但在老投资人强势时也可能会约定新老投资人之间平等顺位，按投资金额比例甚至股权比例分优先金额。相比实际上基本用不上的分红优先权，清算优先权是更实用、也更可能给投资人创造实际价值的经济权利。

2. 好坏通吃 清算优先权可以在公司情况不佳(downside)时让投资人优先拿回一点补偿，也可以在公司获得好的收购机会(upside)时使得投资人获利更多。

3. 只是清算？ 如果“清算事件”仅包括法律意义上的清算(例如公司解散或破产时的清算)，那实际用途不大，关键是它还包括“视同清算事件”。“视同清算事件”的情形通常包括导致控制权变更的合并、收购，以及出售、租赁、转让、以排他性许可或其他方式处置公司全部或大部分资产的事件。考虑到解散或破产清算时公司多半已经没有太多资产可分，发生并购事件才是清算优先权最大的用武之地。

Judge Swain’s decision in the PROMESA Title III bankruptcy proceeding of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) that a federal bankruptcy court cannot compel a municipal debtor to apply special revenues to post-petition debt service payments on special revenue bonds has generated controversy and caused some market participants to question whether, if the decision is upheld by the First Circuit on appeal, the perception that special revenue bonds have special rights in bankruptcy remains justified.

The linked Mintz Levin client advisory discusses a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that held a “make-whole” optional redemption premium to be due upon a refinancing of corporate debt following its automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy.

Today’s U.S. Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trustputs an end to one of Puerto Rico’s multi-pronged efforts to deleverage itself.

A few thoughts on Tuesday’s oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in the litigation over whether Puerto Rico’s Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, an insolvency statute for certain of its government instrumentalities, is void, as the lower federal courts held, under Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code:

A draft of the U.S. Treasury’s proposed debt restructuring legislation began circulating earlier today.  The draft legislation would give Puerto Rico, as well as other U.S. territories, and their municipalities access to U.S. bankruptcy court under a new chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (so-called “Super Chapter 9”) as well as making Puerto Rico’s instrumentalities (but not Puerto Rico itself) potentially eligible to file for bankruptcy under existing Chapter 9.

It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be.  The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.

Last week, the Working Group for the Fiscal and Economic Recovery of Puerto Rico gave the broadest hint yet of the next tactic in Puerto Rico’s ongoing quest to deleverage itself.  Although the details have not yet been articulated, Puerto Rico apparently proposes to blend into a single pot several types of distinct taxes currently earmarked to pay or support different types of bonds issued by a number of its legally separate municipal bond issuers, with the hope that the resulting concoction will meet the tastes of a sufficient number of its differing bond creditors to induce them to