Tolstoy warned that “if you look for perfection, you’ll never be content”; but Tolstoy wasn’t a bankruptcy lawyer. In the world of secured lending, perfection is paramount. A secured lender that has not properly perfected its lien can lose its collateral and end up with unsecured status if its borrower files bankruptcy.

(12) 信托计划中受托人对股权投资应当如何进行管理？

实践中，信托计划受托人取得股权主要基于两种情形，一是基于受托而取得股权，即委托人将自己合法持有的股权作为信托财产，转移至受托人管理和处分；二是基于投资而取得股权，即委托人先把自己合法持有的信托资金或其他财产转移至受托人，进而由受托人通过管理、运用该等受托财产，以增资、受让等方式投资取得股权并对该等股权进行管理和处分。

基于受托人取得股权的不同情形，受托人对股权投资的管理责任不完全相同。

如受托人系基于受托取得股权，受托人的股东身份更接近“名义股东”，其对投资股权的管理主要受限于信托合同约定的信托财产的运用及管理方式。

Judge Swain’s decision in the PROMESA Title III bankruptcy proceeding of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) that a federal bankruptcy court cannot compel a municipal debtor to apply special revenues to post-petition debt service payments on special revenue bonds has generated controversy and caused some market participants to question whether, if the decision is upheld by the First Circuit on appeal, the perception that special revenue bonds have special rights in bankruptcy remains justified.

The linked Mintz Levin client advisory discusses a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that held a “make-whole” optional redemption premium to be due upon a refinancing of corporate debt following its automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy.

Today’s U.S. Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trustputs an end to one of Puerto Rico’s multi-pronged efforts to deleverage itself.

A few thoughts on Tuesday’s oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in the litigation over whether Puerto Rico’s Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, an insolvency statute for certain of its government instrumentalities, is void, as the lower federal courts held, under Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code:

A draft of the U.S. Treasury’s proposed debt restructuring legislation began circulating earlier today.  The draft legislation would give Puerto Rico, as well as other U.S. territories, and their municipalities access to U.S. bankruptcy court under a new chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (so-called “Super Chapter 9”) as well as making Puerto Rico’s instrumentalities (but not Puerto Rico itself) potentially eligible to file for bankruptcy under existing Chapter 9.

It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be.  The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.

Last week, the Working Group for the Fiscal and Economic Recovery of Puerto Rico gave the broadest hint yet of the next tactic in Puerto Rico’s ongoing quest to deleverage itself.  Although the details have not yet been articulated, Puerto Rico apparently proposes to blend into a single pot several types of distinct taxes currently earmarked to pay or support different types of bonds issued by a number of its legally separate municipal bond issuers, with the hope that the resulting concoction will meet the tastes of a sufficient number of its differing bond creditors to induce them to

General introduction to trust margin trading