Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta

On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

(BVerfG, Beschluss vom 12.01.2016, Az. 1 BvR 3102/13)

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat sich per Beschluss vom 12. Januar 2016 zu der Frage geäußert, ob der Ausschluss juristischer Personen von der Bestellung als Insolvenzverwalter verfassungsgemäß ist oder nicht. Anlass war die Verfassungsbeschwer- de einer auf Insolvenzverwaltung spezialisierten Gesellschaft von Rechtsanwälten, welche zuvor die Aufnahme auf die Vorauswahlliste für Insolvenzverwalter eines Amtsgerichts vergeblich vor den Zivilgerichten zu erstreiten versucht hatte.

(Federal Constitutional Court, judgment dated 12 January 2016, case ref. 1 BvR 3102/13)

Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has now ruled on whether the exclusion of legal entities from being appointed as insolvency administrator is constitutional or  not in its judgment dated 12 January 2016. The ruling was triggered by a constitutional complaint from a firm of lawyers specialising in insolvency administration, which had previously argued in vain before the civil courts for inclusion by a local court on its pre-selected list of insolvency administrators.

Mit seinem Urteil vom 10. Dezember 2015, Az. C-594 / 14, hat der EuGH entschieden, dass die Haftung eines Geschäftsführers für verbotene Aus- zahlungen nach Insolvenzreife nach §64 GmbHG eine insolvenzrechtliche Regelung darstellt und deshalb dem Anwendungsbereich der EuInsVO unterliegt.

In its ruling dated 10 December 2015, case ref. C-594 / 14, the ECJ decided that the liability of a managing director for prohibited payments following insolvency under section 64 of the GmbHG is a provision covered by insolvency law and therefore falls within the scope of application of the EU Insolvency Regulation.

In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.