近年来，预重整已成为上市公司进入司法重整前几乎不可或缺的前置环节，其源于本土需求、服务于纾困实践的兴起路径，彰显了市场对高效挽救机制的迫切期待。然而，在立法规则尚属空白、实践探索快速扩张的背景下，该制度正面临深刻的异化趋势：预重整作为解决重整效率瓶颈与确定性风险而诞生的“辅助工具”，当其价值被证明有效后，迅速从“可选项”变成“默认项”，几乎成为上市公司重整的必经之路，其功能从“预先协商桥梁”偏移为“实质工作前置”，进而引致临时管理人角色模糊、权责失衡、企业拯救成本攀升等一系列结构性困境。基于对这一市场趋势的密切关注与忧思，本文聚焦于制度逻辑的完整性、各方权责利的平衡性以及程序正义的可实现性，将依次追溯制度的生成逻辑，呈现规则图谱的留白现状，解剖功能偏移衍生的核心痛点，并最终尝试提出使预重整回归其商业谈判本质、约束于重整前协商程序的路径展望。笔者深信，唯有正视当前实践中的张力与悖论，方能推动这一重要企业风险纾困工具的行稳致远，真正实现其提升困境企业重生效率与公平的初心。

一、制度起源：中国本土语境下的生成逻辑与“生存突围”

前言

2024年8月26日，苏州市检察院发布了《破产检察监督案件审查指引》（以下简称“《指引》”）。《指引》共计四章六十八条，全面涵盖破产检察监督的基本原则、监督范围、审查要素、监督方式和工作保障等内容。一定程度上，这是全国首例由检察机关根据破产程序的不同环节，详细完善地单独出台破产检察监督相关规定。9月30日，江苏省检察院召开破产领域检察监督工作新闻发布会，通报了全省检察机关开展破产领域检察监督工作的整体情况。

在《指引》出台前，检察机关对破产程序进行检察监督的法律规定较为原则化，缺乏实操层面的系统性规范。近年随着破产重整等案件数量的大幅增加，破产法律制度因缺乏直接、高效的违法行为监督与纠偏机制，导致债权人等破产参与主体的救济机制略显单一，在经济发展和立法实践中呈现出局限性。在各界呼吁拓展外部监督机制的背景下，各地检察机关不断深化提升破产检察监督职能。在本次《指引》发布前，江苏省检察院在2020年即已出台《加强破产案件检察监督工作的指导意见（试行）》，尝试更为规范地对破产程序进行检察监督。通过4年时间的摸索、总结与完善，江苏省检察机关共办理涉破产监督案件1,351件，为本次《指引》的出台奠定了理论与实践基础。

Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.

When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.

Background

Recently, in In re Moon Group Inc., a bankruptcy court said no, but the district court, which has agreed to review the decision on an interlocutory appeal, seems far less sure.

Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in the case of CII Parent, Inc., cementing the advice routinely given by bankruptcy counsel to borrowers in default. We always counsel borrower clients in default of the risk associated with lenders taking unilateral actions pre-filing, stripping debtors of valuable options and assets. Thus, we normally recommend to always obtain a forbearance and undertake the preparations required to file a bankruptcy petition immediately upon forbearance termination, although whether or not to file depends on variety of factors that should be considered.

The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.

A mortgage loan repurchase facility (more casually referred to as a "repo") is a financing structure commonly utilized to finance mortgage loans. These facilities are utilized by both residential and commercial mortgage loan originators and aggregators to finance mortgage loans that they originate or acquire. The structure is favored by liquidity providers in the mortgage loan finance arena due to its preferential "safe harbor" treatment under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), as further described below.

Lenders often attempt to limit what a borrower can do outside the ordinary course of business by negotiating contractual protections. Some of these provisions are designed to make the borrowers bankruptcy remote by, for example, requiring the borrower’s Board to include an independent director whose consent is required for a bankruptcy filing. Others, as was the case we discuss here, however, go further by including contractual rights that limit a borrower’s ability to file for bankruptcy without the lender’s consent.

On Sunday, March 12th, the Treasury Department, the FDIC, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) (the Agencies) announced that the New York Department of Financial Services had appointed the FDIC as receiver for Signature Bank, which was closed on March 11th.  Subsequently, the FDIC announced that it had transferred substantially all of the assets and all of the deposits of Signature Bank to the newly created Signature Bridge Bank, N.A.  Early on March 13th, the FDIC announced a similar transfer of assets and deposits to Silicon Valley Bank, N.A., another n