引言

自2022年5月起，上市公司“携带”未到期可转债进入预重整或重整程序的案例逐步在A股视野中涌现。截至目前，重整计划成功执行并顺利处置可转债违约风险的只有*ST正邦（002157）和*ST全筑（603030）两个案例。作为一种上市公司破产重整领域的新兴产品，由于可转债具有债权性、股权性和二级市场可交易等特点，较重整中的其他普通债权更具特殊性，给上市公司破产重整提出了“新课题”，应当在重整中进行定制化处理。

可转债在上市公司破产重整中的处理方式保持了其作为金融工具“进可攻，退可守”的特点，债券持有人可以选择到期兑付、转卖或转股。因此，重整方案设计中最为核心的是保护可转债原持有人在可转债产品项下的合法权利。通常做法为保留可转债持有人一定期限的交易及转股权利，利用可转债的特殊规则为持有人做好权利保护衔接，实现上市公司与持有人的利益共赢。

本文谨从可转债的特殊性及权利保护措施、实践中主要案例总结及重整方案设计要点等三个方面展开，对存续可转债在上市公司破产重整中的处理方式进行总结和探讨。

一、可转债的特殊性及权利保护

（一）可转债的特殊性

引言

2020年10月5日国务院发布的《关于进一步提高上市公司质量的意见》（国发〔2020〕14号）中明确规定，“上市公司实施破产重整的，应当提出解决资金占用、违规担保问题的切实可行方案”。2022年3月，沪深交易所分别发布《上海证券交易所上市公司自律监管指引第13号——破产重整等事项》《深圳证券交易所上市公司自律监管指引第14号——破产重整等事项》，进一步明确了上市公司在申请破产重整时，需要提交包含资金占用情况和违规担保情况的自查报告。至此，上市公司破产重整中两大“红线问题”暨资金占用及违规担保问题，已被提到了空前的高度。在重整前或重整中解决资金占用及违规担保问题已成为法院受理上市公司破产重整的必要条件。

资金占用系指非经营性资金占用，即上市公司控股股东及其关联方非经营性占用上市公司资金，以及变相利用经营性资金往来的形式达到实质非经营性占用上市公司资金的行为。违规担保，系指上市公司及其控股子公司违反法律法规规定或公司章程规定,或超过规定限额对外提供担保的行为。对于陷入危机的上市公司而言，违规担保往往表现为上市公司为控股股东及其关联方提供担保，也是控股股东变相占用上市公司资金的一种形式。因此，资金占用及违规担保问题在上市公司破产重整中往往相伴相生，需要一并解决。

One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.

How does it happen?

As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.

When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?