2022年8月31日、ケイマン諸島のリストラクチャリング・オフィサー制度が施行されました[1]。この制度は、ケイマン諸島における支払不能状態会社の再建に関して、更に柔軟な再建方法を導入するものです。これは、リストラクチャリング請願の提出日から自動支払猶予期間が開始するというという特色もあります。

リストラクチャリング・オフィサー制度導入前において[2]、法定支払猶予の効果を有する再建方法は、ケイマン諸島における裁判所監督形式である再建手続において「ライトタッチ」（訳注：一時的な関与のみの想定）ベースの暫定清算人が選任される場合に限定されていました[3]。リストラクチャリング・オフィサー制度は、その手続面を見直し、さらにその利用に際して障害となるものを取り除いています。これには、(a)暫定清算人選任前に会社清算請願を提出しなければならない点（これは社会的信用を毀損する結果もたらします。）[4]、および、(b)暫定清算人が選任されるまでの間は支払猶予が認められない点[5]が含まれます。

2022年8月31日より前、ケイマン裁判所は、会社法（Companies Act）第104条(3)に基づく会社清算請願が提出された場合、以下の両要件を満たすときに、ライトタッチの暫定清算人を選任することができました。

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

Introduction
Background
Facts
Decision

Introduction

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

Over the past two years, there has been an interesting trend of courts, in certain circumstances, borrowing from principles of insolvency law when determining analogous questions of trust law. Most recently, the private wealth industry has seen this very application in connection with the now infamous proceedings relating to the trust known as the Ironzar II Trust[1].

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .