The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.

We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.

What is the so-called "creditor duty"?

This is the duty, introduced into English common law by the leading case of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd1 in 1988, of company directors to consider, or act in accordance with, the interests of the company's creditors when the company becomes insolvent, or when it approaches, or is at real risk of insolvency.

Background

To encourage parties to transact with debtors in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code in corporate bankruptcies provides highest priority to “administrative expenses,” which include “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); id. § 507(a)(2).

We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws.

A discharge in bankruptcy usually discharges a debtor from the debtor’s liabilities. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, sets forth certain exceptions to this policy, including for “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” While Congress has general authority to establish a bankruptcy system, bankruptcy laws must be “uniform.” But not every aspect of the bankruptcy system is the same across every judicial district.

On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company. 

Background 

On the 19th of August 2021, the English High Court sanctioned a Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by the administrators of Amicus Finance plc (in administration) (“Amicus”) for the company’s solvent exit from administration, enabling the company to be rescued as a going concern (the “Restructuring Plan”).

On 29 September 2021, the English High Court rejected a challenge in respect of Caff Nero's company voluntary arrangement ("CVA"), brought by a landlord on the grounds of material irregularity and unfair prejudice. The single disgruntled landlord, with the backing of the EG Group ("EG") (who were interested in acquiring Caff Nero), argued that the directors of the company and the CVA nominees breached their respective duties in refusing to adjourn or postpone the electronic voting process to vote on the CVA, after EG had submitted an eleventh-hour offer for Caff Nero.