In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

Following the recent conflicting decisions in HQP Corporation (in official liquidation)1(HQP) and Direct Lending Income Feeder Fund, Ltd (in official liquidation)2 (DLI), Simon Dickson and Laura Stone of Mourant Ozannes (Cayman) LLP consider whether shareholder misrepresentation claims can be admitted in a Cayman Islands liquidation.

The Grand Court has allowed the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator under section 104(3) of the Companies Act (2023 Revision) (the Act) for the purpose of facilitating a restructuring, rather than using the tailor-made Restructuring Officer provisions under section 91(B) of the Act.

Background

The Grand Court confirms that the Court has the jurisdiction to appoint an alternative voluntary liquidator in place of a Liquidating Agent under a limited partnership agreement.

Background

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

Many will have waited for a bus only for two to come along at once. So it is in the Cayman Islands, with the ongoing saga as to whether a shareholder can make a claim for misrepresentation in a liquidation and, if so, where such a claim ranks in the order of priority. The rule in Houldsworth barring such claims has been in existence for over 140 years. However, two liquidations have, within weeks of each other, sought to overturn this longstanding rule.

In the Matter of Holt Fund SPC (Unreported, 26 January 2024) is the first occasion where an application has been made to appoint Restructuring Officers over portfolios of a segregated portfolio company. At first glance the judgment appears uncontroversial. However, it highlights a lacuna in the law which readers should be aware of.

Background

The Petitioner sought the appointment of Restructuring Officers (ROs) in respect of two segregated portfolios of the Holt Fund SPC.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

The Privy Council has considered the question of whether an agreement to settle disputes arising out of a shareholders' agreement by arbitration prevents a party to the agreement pursuing a petition to wind up the company on just and equitable grounds.

Background

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.