In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

This Quickguide outlines some practical considerations for companies whose contractual counterparties are experiencing financial distress, including what questions may be asked of the counterparty in relation to its distress and how to negotiate payment terms or recover debts.

1. Overview

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

The Government intends to enhance the UK's cross-border insolvency regime with the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency (MLEG) and, after further consideration, Article X of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments (MLIJ).

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

Government concludes that the permanent Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 measures have been "broadly welcomed", although possible refinements identified A 'Post-Implementation Review' carried out by the Insolvency Service has concluded that the restructuring plan, the standalone moratorium, and the suspension of contractual termination (ipso facto) measures introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA) have all been broadly welcomed by stakeholders and are seen as positive additions to the UK's insolvency and restructuring framework.  The review

An interim government report has concluded that the restructuring plan, the standalone moratorium, and the restriction on contractual termination (ipso facto) measures introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA) satisfy their policy objectives. The report is part of the statutory review which must be carried out within three years of the measures coming into force.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.