On 18 March 2021, the UK Government published its long-awaited white paper on restoring trust in audit and corporate governance.

This follows a series of high-profile audit errors and major corporate collapses, including those of BHS in 2016 and Carillion in 2018, which led the Government to commission three independent reviews into different aspects of the UK’s audit, reporting and corporate governance systems.

The white paper targets large listed and AIM-listed companies, and large private companies where there is a public interest, and primarily focuses on:

On 26 June 2020 the UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the Act) came into force. The Act marked the most significant insolvency reforms in a generation – introducing new permanent restructuring tools (such as the restructuring plan and the moratorium). It also introduced two temporary measures (see our blog post here) specifically dealing with the impact of COVID-19 on companies:

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the Act) introduced significant changes to insolvency law, including permitting companies to propose a “restructuring plan”. The restructuring plan offers a flexible option for companies that sponsor defined benefit pension schemes to compromise their obligations to creditors and, potentially, to the pension scheme itself.

The Pension Schemes Act 2021 (‘the Act’) has received Royal Assent, with the UK government indicating that key provisions will come into force by autumn 2021.

The Act includes a number of provisions that will significantly impact restructuring activity involving financially distressed groups with a UK defined-benefit (DB) pension scheme.

What will change under the Act?

Below are some of the most significant changes being introduced by the Act.

对于《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国民法典〉有关担保制度的解释》（下称“《民法典担保解释》”或“新规”）对金融资管业务的影响，我们在上篇及中篇中从担保物权受托持有、增信文件性质、上市公司对外担保、担保物权登记、抵押预告登记等角度进行了详细探析。本篇我们将从资产收益权回购交易、仲裁与申请实现担保物权程序、担保与破产衔接角度，着重介绍新规的修订及对金融资管业务的影响。择重点概括如下：

一、新规明确特定资产或资产收益权转让及回购交易中让与担保规则的处理方法

After Virgin Atlantic and Pizza Express achieved ‘too much consent’ and did not need cross-class cram down in the end, DeepOcean is the first judgment applying cross-class cram down as part of a restructuring plan.

The High Court has, for the first time, sanctioned a restructuring plan exercising the power to cross-class cram down. The court handed down its sanction order but noted that, as the first decision to use cross-class cram down, a reasoned judgment will follow in due course.

On 13 January 2021, the court sanctioned three interconditional restructuring plans ('the restructuring plans') for three subsidiaries of DeepOcean Group Holding BV (together with all of its subsidiaries, 'the DeepOcean Group'):

At 11pm on 31 December 2020, the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) came into effect implementing the UK’s exit from the single market. The TCA covers some important things in great detail and some things more scantly. Unfortunately for insolvency practitioners, it is largely silent on almost all issues relating to insolvency, meaning that, despite not technically having a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, for insolvency practitioners it may certainly feel that way.

Recognition of insolvency proceedings

On 17 December 2020 the German Parliament has passed the rules on the further development of the German restructuring and insolvency law and it will now enter into force on 1 January 2021. An essential part of the law is the introduction of a corporate stabilisation and restructuring regime, which establishes a legal framework for out-of-court restructurings in Germany on the basis of the EU Restructuring Directive of 20 June 2019 (Directive (EU) 2019/1023) (the Preventive Restructuring Framework).

As widely blogged about, on 26 June 2020 the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the Act) came into force, introducing both far-reaching wholescale reforms to the UK’s restructuring toolbox as well as temporary measures dealing with COVID-19 impacts on companies. The two most significant temporary measures for companies facing financial difficulties as a result of the COVID 19 pandemic were: