On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.
On October 4, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a contractual right of a triangular (non-mutual) setoff was unenforceable in bankruptcy, even though the contract was safe harbored. In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).
On September 2, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a holding by the Court of Chancery that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies do not have standing to sue derivatively. This contrasts with Delaware corporations: the Delaware courts have recognized that when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors become the residual risk-bearers and are permitted to sue derivatively on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as stockholders.
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that a Bankruptcy Judge lacked constitutional authority to issue a final ruling on state law counterclaims by a debtor against a claimant. This is the latest round of a well-known case involving the estate of former model Anna Nicole Smith and the estate of her late husband, wealthy oil magnate J. Howard Marshall.
Introduction
On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.
In two recent decisions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has interpreted narrowly certain of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.
Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code grants a two-year extension of time for a trustee in bankruptcy (or a debtor in possession) to bring law suits, provided that the applicable period to sue didn’t expire before the petition date. It also gives a short extension to the trustee for filing pleadings, curing defaults, and performing other acts on behalf of the debtor. These provisions afford a trustee and debtor in possession valuable time to discover and evaluate potential causes of action and to perform other acts to preserve the debtor’s rights.
On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.
On September 21, 2010, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited leave to appeal a decision of the Bankruptcy Court in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case.1 The Bankruptcy Court held that a key provision of certain transaction documents constituted an unenforceable ipso facto clause. The District Court granted leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court decision even though it was interlocutory.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“WSRCPA”) represents Congress’ attempt to address companies considered “too big to fail.” The statute creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”), which allows the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company1 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole. Commencement of a receivership under the OLA would preempt any proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code.