A guarantor can be made bankrupt where the terms of the guarantee create a debt obligation.

The year 2009 set a record for defaults and restructurings. Ownership of companies changed rapidly and, given the freeze up in capital markets, most of the new capital structures were significantly deleveraged, leaving little role for pre-existing sponsors and other equity holders of troubled companies. Halfway through 2010, even though actual bankruptcies have declined, restructuring continues through an amendment and forbearance process that is driven by the potential consequences to stakeholders in a court supervised restructuring.

The court has held that a statutory demand is valid despite the high default interest rate on an underlying loan.

When a company goes into administration, time does not stop running against its creditors' claims for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980. This is different to where a company goes into liquidation as time does then stop running. The effect there is that the claim stays live whereas in an administration, once the limitation period has expired, the claim is time-barred.

Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new non-judicial receivership al-ternative for resolving troubled financial companies that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system (“Covered Financial Companies”), as described further below. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), on October 12, 2010, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “Proposal”) to begin to implement the provisions of Title II.

The next few years will see the “redevelopment” of the law in two critical areas involving bank failures where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-tion (“FDIC”) is appointed receiver: (i) the relative rights and claims of creditors of a bank or savings and loan holding company, including the FDIC; and (ii) D&O and professional liability. Significant decisions are be-ginning to be issued with regard to the former.

A party cannot appeal a decision made in bankruptcy proceedings by reason only of a personal interest in the outcome. An economic interest is a pre-requisite.

This was confirmed by the court in Sands and another v Monem and another, in which the bankrupt had transferred the interest in his home to his wife before being made bankrupt. The transfer was made allegedly in order to settle a debt, although this was not reflected in the documentation. That transfer was successfully set aside as a preference by the bankrupt's trustee.

In Pick v Sumpter and another, the first defendant's trustee in bankruptcy applied for an order for possession of the defendants' matrimonial home. At the hearing in May 2006, the evidence showed that the sum outstanding as at November 2005 was £25,571 but did not take into account legal costs. That sum was an estimate and did not take into account statutory interest on the bankrupt's debts beyond the date of the hearing, solicitor's costs of the possession hearing or any increase or decrease in the trustee's remuneration.

The court will not review a bankruptcy order where there has been no material change and evidence subsequently adduced could have been available at the original hearing.

Justice has to be seen to be done. Without clear reasons from the court as to the decision it reached, a party is entitled to have reheard issues it raised on an earlier application but which there is no evidence the court considered.