In a recent case, Emmett AJA of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused to make an order to terminate the winding up of an incorporated association. In this article, we re-examine the principles with which the Court will have regard when determining whether to exercise its discretion to terminate the winding up of a company or incorporated association.

Background

Receiverships usually arise from a secured creditor exercising their rights under a loan contract or mortgage following a default. But even where no default occurs, the Supreme Court of New South Wales has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to preserve the property of an association pending the resolution of a dispute about the management of the association’s property.

Jurisdiction

“Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code [(“Code”)] and the doctrine of equitable recoupment entitled [a commercial tenant] to continue paying [reduced] rent … even after its landlord filed for bankruptcy and rejected the Lease,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Nov. 30, 2018. In re Revel AC Inc., 2018 WL 6259316, *6 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2018).

Two courts have added to the murky case law addressing a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to recover a debtor’s tuition payments for their children. In Geltzer v. Oberlin College, et al., 2018 WL 6333588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018), a New York Bankruptcy Judge permitted a trustee to claw back payments that parents made to their financially independent adult children for college-related costs. In Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School, et al., 2018 WL 6182502 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.

The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “does not limit the allowability of unsecured claims for contractual post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on Nov. 26, 2018. In re Tribune Media Company, 2018 WL 6167504 (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2018). In a short and sensible opinion, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s disallowance of an undersecured lender’s fees.

“… Ponzi scheme payments to satisfy legitimate antecedent debts to defendant banks could not be avoided” by a bankruptcy trustee “absent transaction-specific proof of actual intent to defraud or the statutory elements of constructive fraud – transfer by an insolvent debtor who did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on Nov. 20, 2018. Stoebner v. Opportunity Finance LLC, 2018 WL 6055636 at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2018), citing Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W. 2d 638, 653-56 (Minn. 2015).

A license agreement “deemed rejected by operation of law” could not be acquired under a court-approved asset purchase agreement, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Oct. 29, 2018. In re Provider Meds LLC, 2018 WL 5317445, *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2018). Although the acquirer claimed “that it purchased a patent license from [the] debtors in bankruptcy sales of their estates,” the court explained that “a rejected executory contract … could not have been transferred by the bankruptcy sales in question … .” Id., at *1.

“The right of setoff … allows entities to apply their mutual debts against each other to avoid the pointless exercise of ‘making A pay B when B owes A.’” held the Seventh Circuit on Aug. 17, 2018. Berg v. Social Security Administration, 900 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2018). But the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) limits “a creditor’s right of setoff during the ninety-day period prior to the” date of bankruptcy, said the court. Id.

A company’s non-compliance with a statutory demand is the most common method of proving its insolvency in any winding up proceedings. Generally, if it does not make good the debt under the statutory demand within 21 days of service, the company will be presumed to be insolvent. What can a company do if it disputes the legitimacy of the debt?

The basics – compulsory winding up and statutory demands

Prior to March 2017, any right to sue that comprised an asset of a bankrupt’s estate could only be litigated by the trustee of the bankrupt. The inability of a trustee to assign a bankrupt’s cause of action resulted in many such actions not being litigated due to factors such as a lack of resources. This position changed through the insertion into the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in Schedule 2 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy), which expressly permits a trustee to assign to a third party any right to sue that is held by of a bankrupt estate (see section 100-5).