In 2023, we saw an increase in both voluntary administration and receivership appointments in Australia. In the context of Australia's economic climate this was unsurprising — debtor companies were grappling with volatile markets, supply chain disruptions and uncertain economic conditions, and secured lenders were invoking either or both of these regimes as a means of protecting their investments.

Investors in the Australian market are more sophisticated than ever and – unsurprisingly – so too are the restructuring transactions being promoted by these investors. One such transaction is the credit bid. While not a transaction structure that is formally recognised in Australia, a credit bid is a valuable tool in a financier's playbook that can be implemented to achieve a return where the original financing is unable to be repaid in accordance with its terms.

Credit Bidding

A creditors' scheme of arrangement ("Scheme") can be a powerful restructuring tool implemented to achieve a variety of outcomes for a business, ranging from deleveraging or a debt-to-equity conversion to a merger and/or issue of new debt/equity instruments. When managed appropriately, a Scheme can reshape a business' debt and equity profile, setting it up for an improved go-forward operating platform. Below we set out an outline of the Scheme process in Australia and consider some key features that are unique to Australian schemes.

As participants in the Australian debt restructuring market continue to innovate we expect to see an increase in these control transactions, testing further again the Australian statutory regimes.

On July 6-7, 2017, Craig Jalbert, in his capacity as Trustee for F2 Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 187 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending on the nature of the claims). In certain instances, the Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 15, 2017, Curtis R. Smith, as Liquidating Trustee of the Hastings Creditors’ Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 69 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 13, 2017, The Original Soupman, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively “Debtors” or “Original Soupman”) commenced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to its petition, Original Soupman estimates that its assets are between $1 million and $10 million, and its liabilities are between $10 million and $50 million.

On May 17, 2017, GulfMark Offshore, Inc. (“GulfMark” or “Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Starting on April 28, 2017, Craig R. Jalbert, as Distribution Trustee of the Corinthian Distribution Trust, filed approximately 122 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548, 549 and and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending upon the nature of the underlying transactions). The Distribution Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Whether a claim against company management is direct or derivative is not infrequently disputed in litigation before the Delaware Court of Chancery. This determination becomes important in many contexts, including whether it was necessary for plaintiff to make a pre-suit demand upon the board, whether derivative claims of a company have been assigned to a receiver, or whether such claims have previously been settled in a prior litigation.