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Recent months have brought unprecedented challenges to businesses, with no sector immune to the economic repercussions of the pandemic. Yet despite headline news of certain high-profile restructurings and insolvencies, such as Virgin Atlantic, Debenhams, and Edinburgh Woollen Mill, it seems the emergency measures implemented by the UK Government have, to a degree, staved off wide spread economic collapse that may otherwise have been inevitable.

Re Joint Provisional Liquidators of Moody Technology Holdings Ltd [2020] HKCFI 416

The Hong Kong Court has explained why there is no inconsistency between: (a) its domestic insolvency law which does not permit the appointment of provisional liquidators purely for the purposes of restructuring the company; and (b) common law recognition of foreign "soft-touch" provisional liquidators.

What is a soft-touch provisional liquidator?

Introduction

The immediate focus for Britain’s authorities when dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic has been, quite rightly, to secure the best possible health outcome for the greatest number of people.

Subsequently, following a wave of concern regarding the best way of maintaining the financial status-quo for (i) businesses, (ii) employees, and (iii) individuals, the UK government announced an unprecedented series of assistance programmes, designed to counter the impact of previously unknown, and unquantifiable, distress.

Introduction

Clearly there are some major economic challenges ahead.

Many businesses may be able to withstand the challenges ahead but it may very well be that their trading counterparties (whether suppliers, customers or other stakeholders) will not. Whilst these times can represent an opportunity for some, such as potential acquirers (whether of businesses, assets or distressed debt), in most cases, the climate represents a threat to businesses.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.