In Re Boart Longyear Ltd (No 2) the Supreme Court of New South Wales recently approved two creditor schemes of arrangement on the application of Boart Longyear Limited. The schemes were considerably amended after the Court indicated at the first hearing that it was not likely to approve the original schemes on fairness grounds. Significantly, the Court ordered the parties to attend a mediation to resolve the fairness issues – something that has not been done before in a scheme of arrangement in either Australia or the United Kingdom.

The English Court of Appeal has recently decided that a corporation that held shares in a company remained a shareholder notwithstanding the shareholding company's dissolution.

BWE Estates Limited had two shareholders: an individual named David who held 75% of its shares and a company, Belvedere Limited, which held the remaining 25%. Although Belvedere was dissolved in 1996, it remained listed as a shareholder in BWE's share register.

In the English High Court, the joint administrators of four English companies within the former Lehman Brothers group sought directions from the Court in respect of a proposed settlement. The settlement would put to rest substantial inter-company claims including those at issue in the 'Waterfall III' proceedings.

In a second application heard on the same day, Hildyard J considered an application by the administrators of Lehman Brothers Europe Limited (LBEL) for directions that would enable a surplus to be distributed to the sole member of LBEL while LBEL remained in administration. The proposed scheme had material benefits for both shareholders and creditors. The administrators acknowledged that the orders sought were an indirect means of circumventing the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), which does not expressly provide for directors to make distributions during an administration.

The Court of Appeal has recently dismissed an appeal from the High Court's judgment (discussed in our September 2016 update) setting aside a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 after finding that the challenging creditors, who had voted against the compromise, had been unfairly prejudiced by the decision to call only one meeting of creditors.

In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington recently construed the terms of a customary loan agreement to preclude certain hedge funds viewed as “acquir[ing] distressed debt and engag[ing] in predatory lending” from voting on a debtor’s plan of reorganization. Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC v. NB Distressed Debt Investment Fund Ltd. (In re Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC), 2014 WL 909219 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2014).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 1, 2013, that a bankruptcy court had not erred in applying a prime plus 1.75 percent interest rate to a secured lender’s $39 million claim under a "cramdown" plan of reorganization. Wells Fargo Bank N.A v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC (In the Matter of Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 776317 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2013).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "District Court") on March 29, 2012 held that a bankruptcy court sale order issued under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Section 363") could not extinguish state law successor liability personal injury claims brought against the purchaser by third parties injured after the close of the bankruptcy case, but whose injuries arose out of conduct of the debtor prior to its bankruptcy. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Industries, Inc.), 2012 WL 1038672 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

DURING THE PAST YEAR, many investors in the distressed debt market have received postreorganization private equity1 either through a confirmed plan of reorganization or through participation in a rights offering. Unlike publicly traded equity, each new issuance of postreorganization equity leaves recipients, issuers, and agents potentially facing uncharted territory in terms of how the instrument is to trade and settle.