The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of LIBOR-manipulation fraud claims brought by a group of hotel-related entities and their investor against a bank and two of its subsidiaries.

In so ruling, the Second Circuit held that:

(a) the borrower and related entities lacked standing to sue because they failed to list their potential claims in their bankruptcy case and the claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel; and

(b) the claims of the investor and guarantors were untimely and barred by the law of the case.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a court cannot extinguish a secured creditor’s state-law security interests for failure to file a proof of claim during the administration of an equity receivership over entities involved in a Ponzi scheme.

A copy of the opinion in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wells Fargo Bank is available at: Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that the collection of garnished wages earned during the 90 days prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition is an avoidable transfer, even if the garnishment was served before the 90-day preference period.

The ruling creates a potential split with the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, with the Fifth Circuit joining with the Sixth Circuit on the issue.

British law firm DWL LLP has acquired insurance specialist Triton Global for the bargain basement price of 30% of its value.  The deal was struck just days before HM Revenue & Customs attempted to wind the firm up over unpaid tax of £1.3m.  Triton Global was a competitor of DWL, but cash flow difficulties left it unable to cover its working capital requirements and service creditor debt.  The deal sees DWL pay £1.1m for Triton Global, with unsecured creditors set to receive less than 4p to the pound.  Of the purchase price, only £174,000 is allocated to the approxima

In Body Corporate 341188 v Kelly, a judgment debtor sought to overturn an Associate Judge's decision not to set aside a bankruptcy notice.  The notice was in respect of a District Court judgment and a costs order obtained by the Body Corporate in a separate High Court proceeding.  The debtor argued (among other grounds) that the notice was invalid because it was in respect of two judgment debts rather than one.

The Supreme Court has recently dismissed an appeal against a Court of Appeal decision on the disclosure of trust documents to discretionary beneficiaries.

Commercial Factors Ltd v Meltzer concerned a funding agreement between Commercial Factors Ltd (CFL) and the liquidators of Blue Chip New Zealand Ltd (in liq) (Company) by which CFL agreed to lend $67,750 to allow the liquidators to obtain an opinion on the merits of claims against the Company's directors.

If proceedings were commenced, the Company was to pay 2.5% of any proceeds received to CFL.  If the Company did not commence proceedings but otherwise received funds, the agreement stipulated CFL's right to repayment after any liquidator costs.

In 2008, Harvey, an experienced businessman, guaranteed a debt owed to Dunbar Assets plc (Dunbar).  Dunbar subsequently served a statutory demand on Harvey in 2011 for payment under the guarantee.

In 2012, Harvey applied, unsuccessfully, to set aside the demand in the County Court on the ground of promissory estoppel.  However, the demand was subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeal on a completely unrelated ground.

The liquidators of Marathon Imaging Limited (Marathon) brought a claim against the company's director, Mr Greenhill, for a prejudicial disposition of property under section 346 of the Property Law Act 2007 and a breach of director's duties under the Companies Act 1993.  Marathon had begun defaulting on its tax commitments from 2008 onwards and became insolvent shortly after.  The Greenhill Family Trust (Trust), a secured creditor of Marathon, appointed receivers and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue had Marathon placed into liquidation just three days later.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that certain deposits and wire transfers into a bankrupt debtor’s personal, unrestricted checking account in the ordinary course of business were not “transfers” under § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code, affirming the district court’s and bankruptcy court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the bank in an adversary proceeding brought by the bankruptcy trustee.