Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a worldwide estate comprising all of the legal or equitable interests of the debtor, “wherever located,” held by the debtor as of the filing date.¹ The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, in turn, applies “to all entities” and protects the debtor’s property and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction by barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . .

On September 2, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a holding by the Court of Chancery that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies do not have standing to sue derivatively. This contrasts with Delaware corporations: the Delaware courts have recognized that when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors become the residual risk-bearers and are permitted to sue derivatively on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as stockholders.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.  

Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code grants a two-year extension of time for a trustee in bankruptcy (or a debtor in possession) to bring law suits, provided that the applicable period to sue didn’t expire before the petition date. It also gives a short extension to the trustee for filing pleadings, curing defaults, and performing other acts on behalf of the debtor. These provisions afford a trustee and debtor in possession valuable time to discover and evaluate potential causes of action and to perform other acts to preserve the debtor’s rights.

On 18 January 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) issued an interim final rule (the “Rule”) with request for comments regarding certain provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd- Frank Act”). Title II creates the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”), which is a mechanism under which “covered financial companies” can be liquidated in a uniform fashion rather than under inconsistent insolvency regimes.

The treatment of derivatives, or “qualified financial contracts”, under state insurance insolvency laws has received increased attention since the financial crisis. Four states passed laws in 2010 that allow for the exercise of certain netting collateral and termination provisions in an insurance insolvency without regard to the automatic stay mechanism and similar laws are anticipated in other states in 2011. Federal laws provide a level of certainty with respect to the treatment of certain swap agreement provisions in a general corporate bankruptcy. The U.S.

In a recent decision, SEC v Byers,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that district courts possess the authority and discretion to bar the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions without the district court’s permission.

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a foreign representative of a foreign insolvency proceeding to seek a bankruptcy court’s assistance in an ancillary proceeding upon recognition of the foreign proceeding. Upon recognition, Chapter 15 empowers a bankruptcy court to grant broad relief to a foreign representative to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of its creditors in the United States.

Credit bidding of debt held by a secured creditor at a sale of collateral under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code has become commonplace.1 Does a secured creditor have that same ability in a sale under a chapter 11 plan? Most thought so, but according to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, not always.

Two decisions (one only weeks ago) have held that the scope of Bankruptcy Rule 2019 encompasses “informal committees” of bondholders and that such committees must comply with the extensive disclosure requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2019.1 In a recent decision, Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court came out the other way, ruling that such a committee was not a “committee representing more than one creditor” and, consequently, is not subject to Rule 2019.2 In so doing, Judge Sontchi considered but declined to follow the two decisions addressing the same issue: