Deal structure matters, particularly in bankruptcy. The Third Circuit recently ruled that a creditor’s right to future royalty payments in a non-executory contract could be discharged in the counterparty-debtor’s bankruptcy. The decision highlights the importance of properly structuring M&A, earn-out, and royalty-based transactions to ensure creditors receive the benefit of their bargain — even (or especially) if their counterparty later encounters financial distress.

Background

引言

按照《中华人民共和国企业破产法》（“《企业破产法》”）第三十二条[1]规定，管理人有权起诉请求法院撤销破产企业在一定期间内的个别清偿行为。债权人在面对该类个别清偿撤销诉讼时，时常面临举证困难、法律适用不明确等困境。

我们近期代理某金融机构债权人处理一宗个别清偿纠纷诉讼二审程序。本文将尝试结合这一案件，提出我们对上述法律规定的思考，讨论债权人应对个别清偿撤销诉讼的“困境”与“突围”，并且为债权人提供缓释该类纠纷带来的潜在风险的思路。

一、债权人应对个别清偿撤销纠纷的困境

为充实破产企业偿债资产、维护债权人公平受偿，《企业破产法》赋予管理人针对债务人破产前一定期间内特定行为的撤销权。本文关注的是《企业破产法》第三十二条指向的债务人在破产申请受理前6个月内的个别清偿行为，或称“偏颇性清偿行为”。依照该条规定，撤销该类行为需要满足以下条件：

On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

Until recently, courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally followed the minority view that non-debtor releases in a bankruptcy plan are prohibited by Bankruptcy Code Section 524(e), which provides that the “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.” In the summer of 2020, the Ninth Circuit hinted that its prohibition against non-debtor releases was not absolute, when the court issued its decision in Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.

If a creditor is holding property of a party that files bankruptcy, is it “exercising control over” such property (and violating the automatic stay) by refusing the debtor’s turnover demands? According to the Supreme Court, the answer is no – instead, the stay under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code only applies to affirmative acts that disturb the status quo as of the filing date. In other words, the mere retention of property of a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy case does not violate the automatic stay.

On August 26, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code does not require subordination agreements to be strictly enforced in order for a court to confirm a cramdown plan, so long as the plan does not discriminate unfairly.

Leveraged loans continue to be a topic of interest in the current environment, particularly when they are pooled and securitized as collateralized loan obligations. A recent decision sheds light on whether and when leveraged loans and similar instruments may be classified as securities and, therefore, be subject to securities laws.

On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit held that appellants’ state law constructive fraudulent transfer claims were preempted by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors that exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for