Fulltext Search

On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

What is the so-called "creditor duty"?

This is the duty, introduced into English common law by the leading case of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd1 in 1988, of company directors to consider, or act in accordance with, the interests of the company's creditors when the company becomes insolvent, or when it approaches, or is at real risk of insolvency.

Background

On 22 July 2022, the English High Court sanctioned Houst Limited’s (“Houst” or the “Company”) restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”), which significantly, is the first time a Restructuring Plan has been used to cram down HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”) as preferential creditor.1

Background

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

Analizamos las principales novedades en materia de insolvencia internacional contenidas en el Proyecto de Ley de reforma del Texto Refundido de la Ley Concursal. Sin perjuicio del texto final que resulte aprobado tras la correspondiente tramitación parlamentaria, el capítulo dedicado a la insolvencia internacional es uno de los que menos enmiendas han recibido y, por tanto, donde previsiblemente se producirán menos cambios.

We analyze the main novelties of the international insolvency regulation introduced in the Insolvency Law Reform Bill. Although the final wording will be approved after its passage through parliament, the chapter on international insolvency is among those that received the fewest amendments and therefore is expected to see the fewest changes. We therefore predict that all or a large part of the comments made below will also be applicable to the wording of the Insolvency Law that will be approved at the end of the process.

The European Court has issued a sentence of special relevance for the operation and effectiveness of the “pre-pack” insolvency procedures. Specifically, it clarifies the requirements that must be met to respect the rights of workers in the event of business transfers.

El órgano judicial europeo ha dictado una sentencia de especial relevancia para el funcionamiento y efectividad de los 'pre-packs' concursales. En concreto, aclara los requisitos que se deben cumplir para respetar los derechos de los trabajadores en caso de transmisión de empresas.

On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company. 

Background