Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As

New York Bankruptcy Judge Sean H. Lane determined that the Australian debtors in a Chapter 15 foreign recognition proceeding satisfied the U.S. property requirements of Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code on the basis of attorney retainers and claims against insiders located in the U.S.

On February 27, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a circuit split under the Bankruptcy Code and determined that where funds passed through financial institutions acting as payment conduits, where the ultimate transfer sought to be avoided was not the type of transaction protected by the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the safe harbor provisions of Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e), shielding transfers through financial institutions from avoidance actions by bankruptcy trustees, was inapplicable.

In January 2018 the English High Court considered whether it had jurisdiction under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (CBIR) to extend a temporary stay on the commencement of enforcement action in respect of English law debt obligations owed by a foreign debtor so that in effect the stay became permanent, or whether such a permanent stay would breach the long established rule in Gibbs[1](whic

Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)

The bankruptcy court in In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc., 17-10736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017) determined that a decision by an offshore drilling company from the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) to shift its Center of Main Interest (COMI) to the Cayman Islands prior to defaulting on bonds and initiating reorganization proceedings there and in the U.S., was “prudent.” The Court held that the change offered the debtors the best opportunity for successful restructuring and survival under difficult financial conditions and did not preclude U.S.

On September 18, 2017, the iconic US-based retailer Toys “R” Us filed for Chapter 11 in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in front of Judge Keith L. Phillips. The company filed twenty-five entities, explaining that its $5.3 billion debt obligations and operational issues had led to the need for reorganization.

On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code¹ and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,¹ in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.