This week’s TGIF considers a recent decision of the High Court of Australia, in which a 4:3 majority held that a former trustee is not owed any fiduciary obligation by a successor trustee.

Key takeaways

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

In Davis-Jacenko v Roxy’s Bootcamp Pty Limited [2024] NSWSC 702, McGrath J delivered an extempore decision, appointing provisional liquidators in respect of Roxy’s Bootcamp Pty Limited (theCompany). His Honour stated that it was “a paradigm case” for the court to intervene to preserve the status quo.

Key Takeaways

With the mass of reports, reviews and consultations that have already occurred, there is no lack of critiques, complaints and proposed solutions. The risk is that these will (once again) be cherrypicked for fixes, rather than form the basis for a comprehensive review.

It has been 33 years since the "recession we had to have" in 1991. Fears that Australia would enter a technical recession during 2023 didn’t eventuate.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Despites its recent failure in case against an administrator in a phoenixing case, ASIC could snatch long-term victory from the jaws of defeat with clear regulatory guidance for insolvency practitioners.

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

When do amounts owed to a company constitute ‘circulating assets’ and how should they be distributed? This crucial question has not always been answered predictably in recent cases. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Resilient Investment Group Pty Ltd v Barnet and Hodgkinson as liquidators of Spitfire Corporation Limited (in liq) [2023] NSWCA 118 has provided a framework for navigating the relevant principles in the context of a priority dispute over R&D tax refunds.

Key takeaways

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.