This week’s TGIF considers a recent decision of the High Court of Australia, in which a 4:3 majority held that a former trustee is not owed any fiduciary obligation by a successor trustee.

Key takeaways

In Davis-Jacenko v Roxy’s Bootcamp Pty Limited [2024] NSWSC 702, McGrath J delivered an extempore decision, appointing provisional liquidators in respect of Roxy’s Bootcamp Pty Limited (theCompany). His Honour stated that it was “a paradigm case” for the court to intervene to preserve the status quo.

Key Takeaways

Introduction

The first stage in any restructuring by way of a scheme of arrangement in the Cayman Islands involves meetings of such classes of creditors or shareholders (as the case may be) to consider, and if thought fit, approve the terms of the scheme. An application to Court is required for orders to be granted for convening such meetings. If, at these meetings, the requisite statutory majorities are satisfied, the second stage involves obtaining Court sanction for the proposed scheme to become effective.

Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands all have legislation that enables a company to present a scheme of arrangement to restructure its debts.

One of the defining features of a scheme of arrangement carried out under the relevant legislation in each jurisdiction is the ability to cram down dissenting creditors or members (or classes of them, as the case may be) if the requisite statutory majorities are satisfied and Court sanction of the proposed scheme is obtained.

The Eighth Circuit held that “avoidance actions [e.g., preferences, fraudulent transfers] can be sold as property of the [Chapter 7 debtor’s] estate.” In re Simply Essentials, LLC, 2023 WL 5341506, *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 21, 2023). On a direct appeal from the bankruptcy court, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s granting of the trustee’s motions to compromise and sell property under Bankruptcy Code §363(f). A creditor had objected, arguing unsuccessfully that “avoidance actions… are not part of the bankruptcy estate ….” Id.

A recent judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Brake & Anor v The Chedington Court Estate Ltd [2023] UKSC 29 (10 August 2023) is likely to be a welcome decision for liquidators and trustees in bankruptcy in setting clear boundaries as to who has standing to challenge their decision-making in corporate or personal insolvency contexts.

When do amounts owed to a company constitute ‘circulating assets’ and how should they be distributed? This crucial question has not always been answered predictably in recent cases. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Resilient Investment Group Pty Ltd v Barnet and Hodgkinson as liquidators of Spitfire Corporation Limited (in liq) [2023] NSWCA 118 has provided a framework for navigating the relevant principles in the context of a priority dispute over R&D tax refunds.

Key takeaways

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit quietly affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of an involuntary petition because the petitioners’ “claims were the subject of bona fide disputes within the meaning of” Bankruptcy Code (Code) §303(b)(1) (petitioner may not hold claim that is “the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount”). In re Navient Solutions, LLC, 2023 WL 3487051 (2d Cir. May 17, 2023).

On May 30, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a chapter 11 reorganization plan containing nonconsensual releases of direct claims against third-party non-debtors, including the debtor’s controlling owners, the Sacklers.

Is an insolvent debtor’s pre-bankruptcy termination of a commercial lease a fraudulent transfer? The Third Circuit said no when it held that a lessor’s pre-bankruptcy termination of the debtors’ lease and purchase option “was not a transfer under Bankruptcy Code §548(a) (1)(B).” In re Pazzo Pazzo Inc., 2022 WL 17690158 (3d Cir. Dec. 15, 2022). But the Seventh Circuit held that a chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy “surrender of [two] … leases to [its landlord] could be regarded as a preferential [or fraudulent] transfer.” In re Great Lakes Quick Lube L.P., 816 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2016).