In a May 4, 2015 opinion1 , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.
In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:
Dealing a major blow to the trustee’s efforts to recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of the company run by Bernard Madoff, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC1 that the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to recover fraudulent transfers of funds that occur entirely outside the United States.
Judgment in the Court of Appeal case of Pillar Denton v Game Retail- about rent due during the administration of Game was handed down yesterday. It is a landmark ruling for administrators, on the thorny issue of the payment of rent during the period of the tenant’s administration.
This morning we got the news that HMV had gone into administration and last week it was Jessop that went under. HMV’s administrators are still trading from the stores but the administrators of Jessops have ceased trading. Can their landlords expect their rent?
Just a short post to update our previous post on the issue of administrators being obliged to pay rent as an expense of the administration.
In January we posted on the impact of a case that ruled that landlords are able to claim rent as an expense of the administration when a tenant’s administrators are in occupation of all or part of a leasehold property.
A decision by the High Court in December has strengthened the position of landlords who sometimes do not get paid during the administration even where the administrator is running the business from the property.
Certain categories of expense which may be incurred by the company after it has gone into administration, and which an administrator has to pay are known as "expenses of the administration" and the assets of the company in administration must be applied towards payment of these expenses ahead of any payment to creditors under floating charges or to unsecured creditors.
This week we have seen the headlines about the Focus DIY Corporate Voluntary Arrangement (CVA). It is reported that landlords have accepted the CVA and that will enable Focus to continue a significant part of the business and to retain a large number of jobs. Welcome news in many respects.
CVAs can have a significant impact on a property investment so this posting considers how CVAs work and their impact on leases?