2022年8月31日、ケイマン諸島のリストラクチャリング・オフィサー制度が施行されました[1]。この制度は、ケイマン諸島における支払不能状態会社の再建に関して、更に柔軟な再建方法を導入するものです。これは、リストラクチャリング請願の提出日から自動支払猶予期間が開始するというという特色もあります。
リストラクチャリング・オフィサー制度導入前において[2]、法定支払猶予の効果を有する再建方法は、ケイマン諸島における裁判所監督形式である再建手続において「ライトタッチ」（訳注：一時的な関与のみの想定）ベースの暫定清算人が選任される場合に限定されていました[3]。リストラクチャリング・オフィサー制度は、その手続面を見直し、さらにその利用に際して障害となるものを取り除いています。これには、(a)暫定清算人選任前に会社清算請願を提出しなければならない点（これは社会的信用を毀損する結果もたらします。）[4]、および、(b)暫定清算人が選任されるまでの間は支払猶予が認められない点[5]が含まれます。
2022年8月31日より前、ケイマン裁判所は、会社法（Companies Act）第104条(3)に基づく会社清算請願が提出された場合、以下の両要件を満たすときに、ライトタッチの暫定清算人を選任することができました。
In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
On 27 February 2024, the High Court sanctioned a restructuring plan (the Plan) proposed by CB&I UK Limited (CB&I), part of the global McDermott construction and engineering group (the Group). This is the first English restructuring plan to be approved after the Court of Appeal judgment in Adler (see our Alert) and follows the guidance in that case.
Background
On 23 January 2024, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court's sanction of Adler Group's (Adler) restructuring plan (the Plan) (see our alert). This much anticipated judgment provides clarity on the court's discretion to sanction a plan where there are dissenting classes of creditors.
Background
The Plan envisaged:
We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.
The Court of Appeal has recently referred to established case law that the court will only interfere with the act of an officeholder “if he has done something so utterly unreasonable and absurd that no reasonable man would have done it”.
While the judge in the lower court had not made any error of law, on the facts there were identifiable flaws in the judge's reasoning that the trustees' decision not to join in the proceedings was perverse.
The judge had failed to recognise that:
Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.