The UK Supreme Court today delivered an important decision on the meaning of the so-called 'balance sheet insolvency test' in s.123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) (BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail 2007-3BL PLC [2013] UKSC 28 ("Eurosail")).

In Morning Mist Holdings Limited v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Limited), Case No. 11-4376, 2013 WL 1593348 (2d Cir.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 28, 2013, that a secured lender’s full credit bid for a Chapter 11 debtor’s assets at a bankruptcy court sale barred any later recovery from the debtor’s guarantors. In re Spillman Development Group, Ltd., ___ F.3d ___, 2013WL 757648 (5th Cir. 2/28/13). A “credit bid” allows a creditor to “offset its [undisputed] claim against the purchase price,” a right explicitly granted by Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(k). 3 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶ 363.06[10], at 363-59 (16th rev. ed. 2010).

In a corporate system based in part on the separation of ownership and control, the relationship between principals and agents is riddled with agency problems: Among them are potential conflicts of interest where agents may abuse their fiduciary position for their own benefit as opposed to the benefit of the principals to whom they are obligated. Delineating the agents' fiduciary duties is thus a central focus of corporate law, and the dereliction of those duties often comes under scrutiny in the bankruptcy context.

DURING THE PAST YEAR, many investors in the distressed debt market have received postreorganization private equity1 either through a confirmed plan of reorganization or through participation in a rights offering. Unlike publicly traded equity, each new issuance of postreorganization equity leaves recipients, issuers, and agents potentially facing uncharted territory in terms of how the instrument is to trade and settle.

CURRENTLY, NEGOTIATION and documentation of claims trades remain largely unregulated, with only limited oversight from bankruptcy courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Generally, the bankruptcy court’s, or the claims agent’s, involvement in claims trading is ministerial, i.e., maintaining the claims register and recording transfers if the form complies with the rule. Only if there is an objection to a claims transfer does the bankruptcy court become involved in the substance of a transfer.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Philadelphia Newspapers LLC,1 has ruled that secured creditors do not have a right, as a matter of law, to credit bid their claims when their collateral is sold under a plan of reorganization. The Third Circuit held that secured creditors may be barred from credit bidding where a debtor's reorganization plan provides secured creditors with the "indubitable equivalent" of their secured interest in the assets. The court's ruling follows a similar ruling last year by the U.S.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in a split decision, on March 22, 2010, that secured creditors do not have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a “cramdown” reorganization plan. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, et al., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1006647 (3d Cir. March 22, 2010) (2-1).

On March 15, 2010 Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”) filed a motion (the “Motion”) with the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases (the “Court”) seeking authorization to establish certain claims and alternative dispute resolution procedures designed to expedite the process of reconciling claims filed against the Debtors’ estates.

The procedures, set forth in detail in an exhibit to the proposed order filed with the Motion, are summarized as follows:

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held on Nov. 5, 2009, that a creditor was entitled to its post-bankruptcy legal fees incurred on a pre-bankruptcy indemnity agreement. Ogle v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., __F.3d __, No. 09-0691-bk, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24329 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2009). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit explained that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “interposes no bar . . . to recovery.” Id. at *8-9 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S.