A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.
In today's rapidly evolving business landscape, businesses find themselves at the intersection of technological innovation and geopolitical and economic turbulence. Despite the increased reliance on software systems and digital infrastructure, it remains peculiar that in many EU Member States there's still no clear framework for handling software licenses in insolvency.
According to Section 1445 of the Belgian Judicial Code (JC), any creditor can, on the basis of authentic or private documents, levy a (conservatory) garnishment on the sums or goods a third party owes to its debtor. After notification of the garnishment order, the third-party garnishee can no longer hand over these sums and/or goods to the debtor (Section 1451 JC).
Conservatory garnishments are typically used by creditors to put pressure on their debtor (eg notifying a garnishee order to a debtor’s bank, which then freezes the debtor’s accounts).
From 1 September 2023, the restructuring expert will make their first appearance in Belgian restructuring law. This new court-appointed practitioner can be assigned a variety of tasks, ranging from assisting the debtor in negotiations with creditors to supervising the restructuring process and compliance with creditor information obligations.
From 1 September 2023, the Belgian reorganisation procedure by way of a collective plan will be radically changed for large companies. It introduces the obligation to group creditors (and shareholders) into “classes” for the purpose of voting on a restructuring plan.
The Belgian Act of 7 June 2023 transposing EU Restructuring Directive (2019/1023) introduces new rules specifically aimed at large companies filing for a judicial reorganisation through a collective plan (similar to the US Chapter 11 or UK Restructuring Plan procedure).
In Short
The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.
What is the so-called "creditor duty"?
This is the duty, introduced into English common law by the leading case of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd1 in 1988, of company directors to consider, or act in accordance with, the interests of the company's creditors when the company becomes insolvent, or when it approaches, or is at real risk of insolvency.
Background
On 22 July 2022, the English High Court sanctioned Houst Limited’s (“Houst” or the “Company”) restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”), which significantly, is the first time a Restructuring Plan has been used to cram down HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”) as preferential creditor.1
Background
On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company.
Background