A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.

引言

自2022年5月起，上市公司“携带”未到期可转债进入预重整或重整程序的案例逐步在A股视野中涌现。截至目前，重整计划成功执行并顺利处置可转债违约风险的只有*ST正邦（002157）和*ST全筑（603030）两个案例。作为一种上市公司破产重整领域的新兴产品，由于可转债具有债权性、股权性和二级市场可交易等特点，较重整中的其他普通债权更具特殊性，给上市公司破产重整提出了“新课题”，应当在重整中进行定制化处理。

可转债在上市公司破产重整中的处理方式保持了其作为金融工具“进可攻，退可守”的特点，债券持有人可以选择到期兑付、转卖或转股。因此，重整方案设计中最为核心的是保护可转债原持有人在可转债产品项下的合法权利。通常做法为保留可转债持有人一定期限的交易及转股权利，利用可转债的特殊规则为持有人做好权利保护衔接，实现上市公司与持有人的利益共赢。

本文谨从可转债的特殊性及权利保护措施、实践中主要案例总结及重整方案设计要点等三个方面展开，对存续可转债在上市公司破产重整中的处理方式进行总结和探讨。

一、可转债的特殊性及权利保护

（一）可转债的特殊性

引言

2020年10月5日国务院发布的《关于进一步提高上市公司质量的意见》（国发〔2020〕14号）中明确规定，“上市公司实施破产重整的，应当提出解决资金占用、违规担保问题的切实可行方案”。2022年3月，沪深交易所分别发布《上海证券交易所上市公司自律监管指引第13号——破产重整等事项》《深圳证券交易所上市公司自律监管指引第14号——破产重整等事项》，进一步明确了上市公司在申请破产重整时，需要提交包含资金占用情况和违规担保情况的自查报告。至此，上市公司破产重整中两大“红线问题”暨资金占用及违规担保问题，已被提到了空前的高度。在重整前或重整中解决资金占用及违规担保问题已成为法院受理上市公司破产重整的必要条件。

资金占用系指非经营性资金占用，即上市公司控股股东及其关联方非经营性占用上市公司资金，以及变相利用经营性资金往来的形式达到实质非经营性占用上市公司资金的行为。违规担保，系指上市公司及其控股子公司违反法律法规规定或公司章程规定,或超过规定限额对外提供担保的行为。对于陷入危机的上市公司而言，违规担保往往表现为上市公司为控股股东及其关联方提供担保，也是控股股东变相占用上市公司资金的一种形式。因此，资金占用及违规担保问题在上市公司破产重整中往往相伴相生，需要一并解决。

In Short

The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.

Madoff

On April 19, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of a landmark 2019 decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding the applicability of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments to prevent the avoidance in bankruptcy of $8.3 billion in payments made to the shareholders of Tribune Co. as part of its 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO").

On October 26, 2020, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a long-awaited ruling on whether natural gas exploration and production company Ultra Petroleum Corp. ("UPC") must pay a make-whole premium to noteholders under its confirmed chapter 11 plan and whether the noteholders are entitled to postpetition interest on their claims pursuant to the "solvent-debtor exception." On remand from the U.S.

Introduction
Priority of Income Tax Claims
Affirmative Insurance
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
The District Court's Ruling
Outlook

In the latest chapter of more than a decade of contentious litigation surrounding the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") and ensuing bankruptcy of media conglomerate Tribune Co. ("Tribune"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed lower court rulings that Tribune's 2012 chapter 11 plan did not unfairly discriminate against senior noteholders who contended that their distributions were reduced because the plan improperly failed to strictly enforce pre-bankruptcy subordination agreements. In In re Tribune Co., 972 F.3d 228 (3d Cir.