Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code offers powerful protection for good-faith purchasers in bankruptcy sales because it limits appellate review of an approved sale, irrespective of the legal merits of the appeal. Specifically, it provides that the reversal or modification of an order approving the sale of assets in bankruptcy does not affect the validity of the sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending its appeal of the order. That is, section 363(m) renders an appeal "statutorily moot" absent a stay of the sale order.
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees or individual creditors to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is well-established. However, until recently, Delaware bankruptcy courts have uniformly limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the equitable remedy of "substantive consolidation"—i.e., treating the assets and liabilities of two or more related entities as if they belonged to a single, consolidated bankruptcy estate. However, it is well recognized that a bankruptcy court has the authority to order such relief under appropriate circumstances in the exercise of its broad equitable powers when each of the original entities are already debtors subject to the court's jurisdiction.
To shield bankruptcy trustees and certain other entities from litigation arising from actions taken in their official capacity, the "Barton doctrine"—now more than a century old—provides that such litigation may be commenced only with the authority of the appointing court. The doctrine has certain exceptions, one of which—the "ultra vires exception"—was recently examined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as an apparent matter of first impression.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession to sell assets of the bankruptcy estate "free and clear" of "any interest in property" asserted by a non-debtor is an important tool designed to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois recently examined whether such interests include "successor liability" claims that might otherwise be asserted against the purchaser of a debtor's assets. In In re Norrenberns Foods, Inc., 642 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
Nine Point Energy Holdings, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Nine Point" or "Nine Point debtors") constituted an oil and gas production and exploration company that sought to reorganize in chapter 11 through a going concern sale of substantially all of their assets. To maximize value, Nine Point sought to sell those assets free and clear of its midstream services contracts, which included provisions that prevented Nine Point from acquiring midstream services from anyone other than its counterparty, Caliber North Dakota, LLC ("Caliber").
One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.
How does it happen?
As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.
When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.
What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?