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The Situation: In Homaidan v. Sallie Mae, Inc., et al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed that certain types of private student loans are not "obligation[s] to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend" that are exempt from discharge in bankruptcy absent an undue hardship.

The Treasury has released a consultation paper on changes to improve creditors’ schemes of arrangement in Australia (the Consultation Paper).[1] The main proposal in the Consultation Paper is the consideration of a broad automatic moratorium, available to companies proposing a creditors’ schem

In cases under both chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and its repealed predecessor, section 304, U.S. bankruptcy courts have routinely recognized and enforced orders of foreign bankruptcy and insolvency courts as a matter of international comity. However, U.S. bankruptcy courts sometimes disagree over the precise statutory authority for granting such relief, because the provisions of chapter 15 are not particularly clear on this point in all cases.

In the recent case of Re Hydrodec Group Plc [2021] NSWSC 755 (Hydrodec) the Supreme Court of New South Wales (NSW Supreme Court or Court) rejected an application by a non-operating holding company, Hydrodec Group Plc (the Company), for recognition of its United Kingdom (UK) debtor-in-possession Part A1 moratorium process (Part A1 Moratorium) and relief from a winding up application being made against the Company in Australia.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.

In the latest chapter of more than a decade of litigation involving efforts to recover fictitious profits paid to certain customers of Bernard Madoff's defunct brokerage firm as part of the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 976 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.

In Short

The Situation: Circuit courts were split on whether mere retention by a creditor of estate property violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question inCity of Chicago v. Fulton, in which the City of Chicago had refused to return debtors' vehicles after they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.