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The Situation: In Homaidan v. Sallie Mae, Inc., et al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed that certain types of private student loans are not "obligation[s] to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend" that are exempt from discharge in bankruptcy absent an undue hardship.

In cases under both chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and its repealed predecessor, section 304, U.S. bankruptcy courts have routinely recognized and enforced orders of foreign bankruptcy and insolvency courts as a matter of international comity. However, U.S. bankruptcy courts sometimes disagree over the precise statutory authority for granting such relief, because the provisions of chapter 15 are not particularly clear on this point in all cases.

The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment has published the General Scheme of the Companies (Small Company Administrative Rescue Process and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2021. The General Scheme of the Bill amends the Companies Act 2014 to provide for a rescue process specifically designed for small and micro enterprises known as the Small Company Administrative Rescue Process (“SCARP”). Up to 98% of companies fall within the definition of small and micro enterprises and thus have the option to avail of the process where the eligibility criteria are met.

Yesterday, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment announced that the Government has approved the extension until 31 December 2021 of the period during which the interim measures introduced under the Companies (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Covid-19) Act 2020 (the 2020 Act) (link to announcement here) will apply.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.

In the latest chapter of more than a decade of litigation involving efforts to recover fictitious profits paid to certain customers of Bernard Madoff's defunct brokerage firm as part of the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 976 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.

In Short

The Situation: Circuit courts were split on whether mere retention by a creditor of estate property violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question inCity of Chicago v. Fulton, in which the City of Chicago had refused to return debtors' vehicles after they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.