After a creditor or equity security holder casts its vote to accept or reject a chapter 11 plan, the vote can be changed or withdrawn "for cause shown" in accordance with Rule 3018(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("Rule 3018(a)"). However, "cause" is not defined in Rule 3018(a), and relatively few courts have addressed the meaning of the term in this context in reported decisions.

A "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case following a sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets has become increasingly common as a way to minimize cost and maximize creditor recoveries. However, only a handful of rulings have been issued on the subject, perhaps because bankruptcy courts are unclear as to whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the remedy. A Texas bankruptcy court recently added to this slim body of jurisprudence. InIn re Buffet Partners, L.P., 2014 BL 207602 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equity holders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in undertaking to implement its underlying policy objectives. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this issue in In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 2014 BL 21201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).

THE YEAR IN BANKRUPTCY: 2013
Charles M. Oellermann and Mark G. Douglas
The eyes of the financial world were on the U.S. during 2013. The view was dismaying
and encouraging in roughly equal parts. The U.S. rang in the new year with a postlast-
minute deal to avoid the Fiscal Cliff that kicked negotiations over “sequestration”—$
110 billion in across-the-board cuts to military and domestic spending—two
months down the road, but raised income taxes (on the wealthiest Americans) for
the first time in two decades.

In 2011, the Spanish legislator introduced the court-sanctioned refinancing agreement (‘Spanish Scheme’) in the Spanish insolvency system. While the introduction of the Spanish Scheme has been praised for providing new tools for debtors to reorganise out-of-court while addressing the collective action problem, certain of its provisions have made this instrument too rigid and, thus, ineffective for tackling Spanish restructurings.

The eyes of the financial world were on the U.S. during 2013. The view was dismaying and encouraging in roughly equal parts. The U.S. rang in the new year with a post-last-minute deal to avoid the Fiscal Cliff that kicked negotiations over "sequestration"—$110 billion in across-the-board cuts to military and domestic spending—two months down the road, but raised income taxes (on the wealthiest Americans) for the first time in two decades. 

Commercial landlords hailed as a significant victory the enactment in 2005 of a 210-day “drop dead” period after which a lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee is deemed rejected unless, prior to the expiration of the period, a chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) or bankruptcy trustee assumes or rejects the lease.

“Safe harbors” in the Bankruptcy Code designed to minimize “systemic risk”—disruption in the securities and commodities markets that could otherwise be caused by a counterparty’s bankruptcy filing—have been the focus of a considerable amount of judicial scrutiny in recent years. The latest contribution to this growing body of sometimes controversial jurisprudence was recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

One of the prerequisites to confirmation of a cramdown (nonconsensual) chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.

Compensation of a debt made after the debtor’s bankruptcy declaration via the appropriation of securities pledged by virtue of a financial guarantee, is admitted.

The validity of a transaction assessed as “compensation” that was carried out after the bankruptcy declaration of the company in debt was questioned before the Supreme Court. The credit entity applied the value obtained from the reimbursement of an investment fund that had been pledged to secure a credit policy to reduce the debt.