The eyes of the financial world were on the U.S. during 2013. The view was dismaying and encouraging in roughly equal parts. The U.S. rang in the new year with a post-last-minute deal to avoid the Fiscal Cliff that kicked negotiations over "sequestration"—$110 billion in across-the-board cuts to military and domestic spending—two months down the road, but raised income taxes (on the wealthiest Americans) for the first time in two decades.
A bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York recently held that section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not prevent a debtor’s creditors from bringing state-law fraudulent conveyance actions that challenge a leveraged buyout of the debtor. Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), No. 10-4609 (REG), --- B.R. ----, 2014 WL 118036 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014).
TheLehman Brothers bankruptcy court has determined that the contractually specified methodology for conducting the liquidation of a swap agreement is protected by the safe harbor provisions of the bankruptcy, even if the selected methodology would be more favorable to the non-defaulting counterparty than the liquidation methodology that would apply absent the bankruptcy.See Michigan State Housing Dev. Auth. v. Lehman Bros. Deriv. Prods. Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 08-13555, ---B.R.
Commercial landlords hailed as a significant victory the enactment in 2005 of a 210-day “drop dead” period after which a lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee is deemed rejected unless, prior to the expiration of the period, a chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) or bankruptcy trustee assumes or rejects the lease.
A Western District of New York bankruptcy court has held that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code apply to leveraged buy-outs of privately held securities. See Cyganowski v. Lapides (In re Batavia Nursing Home, LLC), No. 12-1145 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013).
“Safe harbors” in the Bankruptcy Code designed to minimize “systemic risk”—disruption in the securities and commodities markets that could otherwise be caused by a counterparty’s bankruptcy filing—have been the focus of a considerable amount of judicial scrutiny in recent years. The latest contribution to this growing body of sometimes controversial jurisprudence was recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding1 holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.
One of the prerequisites to confirmation of a cramdown (nonconsensual) chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.
Few courts have construed the meaning of “repurchase agreement” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, so the recent HomeBanc1 case out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware is a must-read for “repo” counterparties. The principal issue in HomeBanc was whether several zero purchase price repo transactions under the parties’ contract for the sale and repurchase of mortgage-backed securities fell within the definition of a “repurchase agreement” in Section 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code.
December 2012 marked the fifth anniversary of the beginning of the Great Recession, which officially began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 (at least in the U.S.). Five years down the road, the U.S. economy is undeniably on the road to recovery, with unemployment down to 7.8 percent from a high of 10.2 percent in October 2009, a significant drop in mortgage-foreclosure rates, and a housing market strengthened by the lowest mortgage rates in history. Even so, the recovery is shaky.