The Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provisions are a powerful tool for debtors in the plan confirmation process. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan may be confirmed if, among other things, “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan.” Once there is an impaired accepting class, and assuming certain requirements are met, the plan may then be “crammed down” on all other classes of impaired creditors that reject the plan and those creditors will be bound by the terms of a plan they rejected.

Recoupment is an equitable remedy – not expressly addressed in the Bankruptcy Code – that permits the offset of mutual debts arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Unlike typical setoff, if recoupment applies, prepetition debts can be set off against postpetition debts. A recent decision from the Delaware bankruptcy court demonstrates that the availability of recoupment often depends on how the court defines the contours of the “same transaction or occurrence” requirement.

In a November 17, 2016 ruling likely to impact ongoing debt restructurings, pending bankruptcy proceedings and negotiations of new debt issuances, the Third Circuit recently overturned refusals by both the Delaware bankruptcy court and district court to enforce “make-whole” payments from Energy Futures Holding Company LLC and EFIH Finance Inc. (collectively, “EFIH”) to rule that the relevant indenture provisions supported the payments. The case was remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently faced a question of first impression: whether an allowed postpetition administrative expense claim can be used to set off preference liability. In concluding that it can, the court took a closer look at the nature of a preference claim.

Facts and Arguments

Courts have applied various standards for determining when a “claim” arises for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, particularly in the tort context. A recent decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania illustrates that the standard may differ depending on whether the claim in question is a creditor’s claim against the debtor’s estate or a debtor’s claim against a third-party.

Practitioners generally identify “excusable neglect” as the standard that bankruptcy courts apply in determining whether to allow a creditor’s untimely proof of claim. A creditor who lets the bar date pass finds itself in the undesirable position of having to persuade the bankruptcy court that its neglect to file a timely proof of claim was excusable.

On May 15, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision^[1]  in the much-watched litigation involving the residential construction company, TOUSA, Inc. ("TOUSA"). The decision reversed the prior decision of the District Court, ^[2] reinstating the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court.^[3]

Background

Indentures often contain make-whole premiums payable upon early redemption of the debt, and term B loan agreements often include "soft call" protection in the form of prepayment premiums during the early life of the loan. If the debt issuer becomes subject to a chapter 11 proceeding after the debt issuance, the question then arises as to how this payment obligation is to be treated: Does the make-whole or prepayment premium constitute unmatured interest due as a result of the debt acceleration, which would be disallowed, or is it liquidated damages?