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The proposal to reinstate Crown preference in insolvency has met resistance from all angles; the insolvency profession, turnaround experts, accountants, lawyers and funders. But despite HMRC’s bold statement in its consultation paper that the re-introduction of Crown preference will have little impact on funders, it is clear following a discussion with lenders that it may well have a far wider impact on existing and new business, business rescue and the economy in general than HMRC believes.

It always amazes me when, after more than a half-century of Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) jurisprudence, an issue one thinks would arise quite commonly appears never to have been decided in a reported case. Such an issue was recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an adversary proceeding in the Pettit Oil Co. Chapter 7 case.[1]

With the gradual opening of energy supply markets allowing new energy providers to challenge the established providers and bring increased competition to the market, the last two decades have seen an increase in smaller energy providers entering the market and sharing a growing customer base. But what happens to the customers when an energy provider becomes insolvent?

Can another vain attempt to mitigate a $1.5 billion mistake provide the occasion for a thorough review of the doctrine of earmarking? It did for Southern District Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn in the long tail on the General Motors bankruptcy case.

Although it may be difficult to define precisely what an “executory contract” is (with the Bankruptcy Code providing no definition), I think most bankruptcy lawyers feel how the late Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously felt about obscenity--we know one when we see it. Determining that a patent license was executory in the first place was an issue in the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in RPD Holdings, L.L.C. v.

In hindsight, it seems inevitable that constitutional and other jurisdictional problems would arise when Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, created impressive new powers and responsibilities for the bankruptcy courts (along with a considerable degree of independence) but denied them the status of Article III courts under the Constitution (by denying its judges lifetime tenure, as Article III requires). And it didn’t take long for the problems to arise.