An all too typical fact pattern involves a small-time ne’er-do-well infringing on the rights of a much bigger corporation. When the corporation is forced to bring a lawsuit, the “little guy” infringer cries poverty and seeks a settlement. An oft-used tactic of corporations is to settle the matter quickly (and before too much in attorneys’ fees has been incurred) for a relatively modest sum (or even no money at all) while also including a mechanism by which any breach of the settlement agreement triggers the filing of an agreed judgment for a large sum of money.

In a unanimous decision Bartenwerfer v Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S. (2023), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the breath of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s discharge provision – and exceptions thereto – and held that a debt resulting from fraud (even where the debtor was not directly involved) is, nevertheless, nondischargeable. While the Court’s principles provide a roadmap for analyzing potentially nondischargeable claims, it also expands what was originally thought to be a “narrow” exception to discharge.

Airlines throughout the world were unable to fully trade during the pandemic-related lockdowns and their subsequent travel restrictions, creating significant liquidity constraints during       2020–22.  As a result, a number of major international airlines—including Aeroméxico, Avianca, LATAM, Norwegian Air Shuttle, SAS and Virgin Australia—were forced to file for bankruptcy protection or insolvency administration, and many airline lessors were forced to agree to defer lease rental payments from their airline customers.

The U.S. Supreme Court does not like bankruptcy benefits for individual debtors. It really doesn’t.

An example from a couple years ago is Fulton v. City of Chicago, where the U.S. Supreme Court finds a way to declare:

The Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (Lac du Flambeau Band) found support from law professors specializing in federal Indian law as well as an assemblage of tribes and Native American groups in its bid before the U.S. Supreme Court to assert sovereign immunity from suit regarding alleged violations of the automatic stay. While they acknowledge that tribal immunity may be abrogated, they insist Congress must do so expressly and unequivocally.

Once asserted, may a party alter it? Once claimed, may a party contradict it?

A party’s ability to abandon a previously taken position and champion its converse in a later case or proceeding often depends on one of the law’s more esoteric prohibitions: that kaleidoscopic smorgasbord of precepts collectively known as “judicial estoppel.”

What Is “Judicial Estoppel,” Precisely?

WithinIn re LTL Management, LLC, No. 22-2003 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2023), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued its decision on the J&J “Texas –Two Step” bankruptcy saga. The Court’s decision complimented the parties and the lower court for their thorough analysis of the issues, but refocused practitioners on a basic bankruptcy principle:

[A bankruptcy filing] gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor…a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.

On February 13, 2023, Ultra Petroleum Corporation (“Ultra”) filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the US Supreme Court seeking review of the Fifth Circuit’s October 2022 ruling that, in solvent-debtor cases, debtors must pay unsecured creditors applicable contractual make-whole premiums and postpetition interest at contractual default rates in order for such unsecured creditors to be considered unimpaired.

One concept—“center of main interests,” or COMI for short, one of the more significant elements borrowed from international law and incorporated into Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code—sits at the heart of the latter, enacted in 2005 as the latest U.S. legislative attempt to handle cross-border insolvencies and international restructurings.

In spite of this notion’s importance, however, bankruptcy and appellate federal courts have long divided over a thresholder issue: as of which date should a foreign debtor’s COMI be determined?

Can a corporate debtor be denied a Subchapter V discharge under § 523(a), despite this § 523(a) language (emphasis added):

• “A discharge under section . . . 1192 [Subchapter V] . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from . . . ”?

A recent Bankruptcy Court opinion (in Avion Funding) says, essentially, this: “No! You can’t paint over explicit statutory language.”[Fn. 1]

Such recent opinion: