In December 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held as a matter of first impression in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor “under this title” to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a matter of first impression, the Delaware Court of Chancery held inQuadrant Structured Products Co. Ltd. v. Vertin, No. 6990-VCL, 2015 BL 128889 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2015), that a creditor suing derivatively on behalf of an insolvent corporation does not lose standing to prosecute the derivative claims if the corporation becomes solvent while the lawsuit is pending. In so ruling, the court expressly rejected a “continuous insolvency” or an “irretrievable insolvency” requirement for standing purposes.

Nine Point Energy Holdings, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Nine Point" or "Nine Point debtors") constituted an oil and gas production and exploration company that sought to reorganize in chapter 11 through a going concern sale of substantially all of their assets. To maximize value, Nine Point sought to sell those assets free and clear of its midstream services contracts, which included provisions that prevented Nine Point from acquiring midstream services from anyone other than its counterparty, Caliber North Dakota, LLC ("Caliber").

In cases under both chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and its repealed predecessor, section 304, U.S. bankruptcy courts have routinely recognized and enforced orders of foreign bankruptcy and insolvency courts as a matter of international comity. However, U.S. bankruptcy courts sometimes disagree over the precise statutory authority for granting such relief, because the provisions of chapter 15 are not particularly clear on this point in all cases.

A basic tenet of bankruptcy law, premised on the legal separateness of a debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy and the estate created upon a bankruptcy filing, is that prepetition debts are generally treated differently than debts incurred by the estate, which are generally treated as priority administrative expenses. However, this seemingly straightforward principle is sometimes difficult to apply in cases where a debt technically "arose" or "was incurred" prepetition, but does not become payable until sometime during the bankruptcy case.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to sell assets of the bankruptcy estate "free and clear" of "any interest" in the property asserted by a non-debtor is an important tool designed to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California recently examined whether such interests include "successor liability" claims that might otherwise be asserted against the purchaser of a debtor's assets. In In re Catalina Sea Ranch, LLC, 2020 WL 1900308 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.

In Short

The Situation. In Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether bankruptcy court orders conclusively denying relief from the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay are immediately appealable.

The Result. On January 14, 2020, the Court unanimously ruled that an order conclusively resolving a motion for relief from the automatic stay was immediately appealable, such that a later-filed appeal was untimely and must be dismissed.

The recent chapter 11 filings by PG&E Corp. and its Pacific Gas & Electric Co. utility subsidiary (collectively, "PG&E") and FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. have reignited the debate over the power of a U.S. bankruptcy court to authorize the rejection of contracts regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Only a handful of courts have addressed this thorny issue to date, and with conflicting results in a controversy that may ultimately need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court or legislative action.

On September 21, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware affirmed a bankruptcy court's ruling that it had the constitutional authority to grant nonconsensual third-party releases in an order confirming the chapter 11 plan of laboratory testing company Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC ("Millennium"). SeeOpt-Out Lenders v. Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC (In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC), 2018 WL 4521941 (D. Del. Sept. 21, 2018).

In U.S. Capital Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, No. 15-1509 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an appellate court should apply a deferential standard of review to a bankruptcy court's decision as to whether a creditor is a "nonstatutory" insider. Nonstatutory insiders are creditors who are not specifically designated as insiders under the Bankruptcy Code (such as officers, directors, and controlling shareholders), but who the bankruptcy court determines nonetheless have sufficient influence over a debtor to be deemed insiders.