"Cramdown" chapter 11 plans, under which a bankruptcy court confirms a plan over the objection of a class of creditors, are relatively common. Less common are the subset of cramdown plans known as "cram-up" chapter 11 plans. These plans are referred to as such because they typically involve plans of reorganization that are accepted by junior creditors and then "crammed up" to bind objecting senior creditors.

In This Issue:

U.S. Supreme Court: Creditors May Immediately Appeal Denials of Automatic-Stay Relief

After discussions among judges from several jurisdictions, including Argentina, Australia, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Canada, the Cayman Islands, England and Wales, Singapore, and the United States, at the initial meeting of the Judicial Insolvency Network (the "JIN") in October 2016, the JIN developed Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation Between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (the "Guidelines").

For more than a century, courts in England and Wales have refused to recognize or enforce foreign court judgments or proceedings that discharge or compromise debts governed by English law. In accordance with a rule (the "Gibbs Rule") stated in an 1890 decision by the English Court of Appeal, creditors holding debt governed by English law may still sue to recover the full amount of their debts in England even if such debts have been discharged or modified in connection with a non-U.K.

In In re Avanti Commc'ns Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018), Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code enforcing a scheme of arrangement sanctioned by a court in England that included nonconsensual third-party releases. Judge Glenn determined that such releases should be recognized and enforced consistent with principles of "comity" and cooperation with foreign courts inherent under chapter 15.

In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.

In Feltman v. Noor Staffing Grp., LLC (In re Corp. Res. Servs. Inc.), 564 B.R. 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017), the bankruptcy court considered whether section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code creates a right of setoff when no such right is available under applicable nonbankruptcy law. The court concluded that section 553 does not create an independent federal right of setoff, but merely preserves any such right that exists under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

An important aspect of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 ("PROMESA")—the temporary stay of creditor collection efforts that came into effect upon its enactment—was the subject of a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Peaje Investments LLC v. García-Padilla, 845 F.3d 505 (1st Cir. 2017), the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a lower court order denying two motions for relief from the PROMESA stay.

In its highly anticipated Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp. decision,[1] the U.S.

On June 13, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld lower court rulings declaring unconstitutional a 2014 Puerto Rico law, portions of which mirrored chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, that would have allowed the commonwealth’s public instrumentalities to restructure a significant portion of Puerto Rico’s bond debt (widely reported to be as much as $72 billion). In Commonwealth v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 2016 BL 187308 (U.S.