Introduction
A recent decision by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York regarding the terms of an engagement letter demonstrates the need to clearly articulate the intended purpose and scope of an engagement. As the case described below demonstrates, if there is any ambiguity with regard to whether or not a fee must be paid and/or when an engagement is terminated, the resolution of such ambiguity may depend upon the description of the engagement’s purpose.
In its August 5th, 2021 VeroBlue Farms decision,[1] the Eighth Circuit lent its voice to a growing body of criticism of the equitable mootness doctrine contending that its use to bar challenges to confirmed reorganization plans should be circumscribed.
On February 8, 2021, three student loan borrowers filed an involuntary petition against Navient Solutions LLC in New York bankruptcy court seeking to force Navient into bankruptcy.[1] Navient Solutions is the loan servicing arm of Navient Corporation, a student loan originator which manages approximately $300 billion in student loan debt for more than 12 million borrowers.
Since filing for Chapter 11 in May 2020, Hertz and its major stakeholders have been in negotiations and, at times, disputes over how best to reduce Hertz’s nearly half-a-million vehicle fleet. These negotiations and disputes have caught the eye of investors in asset-backed securities (“ABS”) and market watchers alike, as the outcome of the case could have rippling effects across the ABS industry and capital markets, generally.
Last October we highlighted an important ruling issued in September 2019 by the Seventh Circuit in the bankruptcy proceeding of In re I80 Equipment, LLC.
Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.
Background
Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):
U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, No. 15-1509
Harris v. Viegelahn, No. 14-400 (previously described in the December 15, 2014, Docket Report)
The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently certified to the New York Court of Appeals two questions concerning the ability of a judgment creditor to garnish accounts of judgment debtors at non-US subsidiaries of banks that have branches in New York or are otherwise subject to jurisdiction in New York.