The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its ruling in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp. that provided much needed clarity to creditors and issuers involved in out-of-court restructurings affecting noteholders. The issue for the court was whether Education Management Corp. (“EDMC”) violated the Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”) when it implemented a restructuring that impaired the rights of one of its unsecured noteholders, Marblegate Asset Management, LLC (the “Noteholder”).
On July 24, 2013, Judge Steven W. Rhodes of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan approved the City of Detroit’s motion to extend the automatic stay to various non-debtor parties, including certain state officials. The Court’s ruling effectively stays all pending litigation against the City, allows the City to continue to move forward with its chapter 9 case, and paves the way for a dispute over the City’s eligibility to file for chapter 9.
The Chapter 9 Filing and the State Court Litigation
On November 7, 2012, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan for the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held that payments made in connection with a leveraged buyout to holders of privately held securities were safe harbored under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code notwithstanding the fact that the payments passed directly from the purchaser to the seller without the use of any financial intermediary. AP Services LLP v. Silva, et al., Case No. 11-03005 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2012).
Late last week, Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York heard arguments from a number of parties regarding whether the New York bankruptcy court is the proper venue for Patriot Coal Corporation’s bankruptcy cases. In re Patriot Coal Corp., Case No. 1:12-bk-12900. Judge Chapman did not rule on the venue question from the bench. Instead, the parties will wait for a ruling while proceeding with the bankruptcy case.
The recent chapter 11 case of the storied New York law firm, Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, will raise a host of issues attendant to the dissolution of a modern day “big law” firm partnership. Chief among these issues is likely to be whether the profits earned by former Dewey partners in completing Dewey’s open client matters belong to Dewey or the former Dewey partners.
On October 4, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a contractual right of a triangular (non-mutual) setoff was unenforceable in bankruptcy, even though the contract was safe harbored. In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).
In a recent decision in the chapter 11 case of WestPoint Stevens, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code to render an appeal of sale under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code statutorily moot. The Second Circuit held that because the Bankruptcy Court had not stayed the order authorizing the sale, a stay of only one aspect of the sale rendered moot of the sale in its entirety.
As the economy boomed in 2005-2007 and leverage increased to staggering levels, LBOs took a prominent place in the deal economy. During that time, investors completed 313 LBOs in the United States for approximately $630 billion.1 Following the recent economic downturn, many of those LBOs have become sources of controversy in a number of bankruptcies and restructurings - prominent examples include Tribune Co. and Lyondell Chemical Co.
In Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
In recent opinions, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have revisited the doctrine of equitable subordination and have underscored the requirement that, before a court can equitably subordinate a creditor’s claim, the court must find that other creditors have been harmed by the actions of the creditor. Importantly, both decisions stress that equitable subordination is meant to be remedial and not punitive, and may not be imposed merely because a creditor has engaged in misconduct.