The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.

While the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision in section 546(e) previously provided comfort for brokerdealers, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), chips away at this provision and creates new risks for those providing brokerage account services. Always at risk as a deep pocket, new duties have been thrust upon brokerdealers that go far beyond the terms of the account agreement.

Factual Background

On November 8, 2018, Judge Vyskocil of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision dismissing the involuntary petition that had been filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a non-recourse CDO, thus ending a nearly seventeen-month-long saga that was followed closely by bankruptcy practitioners and securitization professionals alike. SeeTaberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd., et. al., (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.), No. 17-11628 (MKV), 2018 WL 5880918, at *24 (Bankr.

On September 26, 2013, Judge Steven W. Rhodes of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the Official Committee of Retirees’ (the “Committee”) motion to stay all eligibility proceedings pending its motion to withdraw the reference. In re City of Detroit, Michigan, Case No. 13-53846, ECF No. 1039 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept.

California has seen a string of three Chapter 9 filings this year and faces a long line of distressed municipalities.  Given this backdrop, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) figures to play a prominent role in the resolution of many of these situations (in or out of bankruptcy).  Thus, the bond‑buying public will scrutinize closely any steps that CalPERS takes to protect its claims in the Bankruptcy Court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reiterated its position that the doctrine of equitable mootness should only apply if granting relief on appeal would undermine a consummated bankruptcy plan. In In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the Third Circuit held that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania abused its discretion when summarily finding that the appeal at issue was equitably moot simply because the appellants failed to seek a stay and the debtors’ plan had been substantially consummated.

On June 13, 2012, Judge Harlin D. Hale of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas refused to enforce provisions of a Mexican plan of reorganization that purported to extinguish guarantees by the debtor’s non-debtor subsidiaries.  In refusing to enforce the non-debtor release, Judge Hale held both that the release of non-debtor guarantors was contrary to United States public policy and that the release did not merit enforcement under the specific criteria of chapter 15 for granting relief to a foreign debtor.

On July 22, 2011, Bankruptcy Judge Craig A.

In Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil Co.),1 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a trustee could avoid a debtor's post-petition transfers of funds that were cash collateral, notwithstanding that the payments had been made in good faith and in the ordinary course of business.

Introduction

Several recent bankruptcy decisions rendered in the Third Circuit address whether the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to informal or “ad hoc” committees.1 Although these courts base their reasoning on the “plain meaning” of Rule 2019, their ultimate holdings are inconsistent and have generated renewed interest in this topic among lenders and the investing community. This article provides a brief summary of these recent decisions and examines their inconsistencies.